Tuesday, May 19, 2020

No equality before the Australian Bench and at the Australian Bar until Asian lawyers can behave as badly as whites

by Ganesh Sahathevan


Beasley SC: one last bite. Tempting to think that Asian lawyers also can indulge in this type of witticism, but it will probably be career ending.

Readers  may recall  that this writer has been found not fit and proper for admission  to practise at the Supreme Court Of NSW, and subsequently all other Australian jurisdictions. 
The decision of the  NSW Legal Profession Admission Board chaired the Chief Justice Of NSW, Tom Bathurst,  is based on findings that include this writer's part in an international conspiracy which involved corrupting journalists at the ABC 4 Corners programme (see story below).

The findings included a significant amount of evidence about this writer's tendency to angry, threatening and intimidating behaviour. That evidence included complaints about the College Of Law (which are now being investigated in Malaysia) and of this writer's work as a journalist. 

Faced with the findings of such an eminent body as the NSW LPAB and the Chief Justice a thorough examination of conduct and conscience has been embarked upon, which has naturally included looking to one's betters for examples of proper behaviour.  
Research had led to the following examples:

From Richard Beasely SC, as quoted by Justinian:


Barnaby Joyce's testicles.
Then, the lawyers named in this story from the SMH dated 15 September 2018, headlined "Police investigate following top legal eagles' swanky party" . 

The violence described in the SMH story frightens even this writer despite his close to 40 years experience in the martial arts, a 5th Dan Black Belt in taekwondo,and ongoing training in full contact combat sports. 


It does appear as if the Australian Bar and Bench, while outwardly de-crying the lack of  "diversity", expect Asians and other non-whites to conduct themselves like house servants or plantation slaves, always obedient and circumspect, and never ever like their white masters. 

END




Business
Bizarre claims used to deny lawyer certificate
BEN BUTLER, EXCLUSIVE
812 words
17 January 2019
AUSTLN
Australian
14
English
© 2019 News Limited. All rights reserved.
The body overseen by Chief Justice Tom Bathurst responsible for deciding who can practise law in NSW relied on a wildly defamatory Malaysian blog depicting ABC journalists, former British prime minister Tony Blair, financier George Soros and others as part of a global conspiracy when deciding to deny a would-be solicitor a certificate to practise.
Chief Justice Bathurst and Legal Practitioner Admission Board executive officer Louise Pritchard declined to answer The Australian’s questions about how the article came into the board’s hands and why its members felt the conspiracy-laden material could be relied upon as part of a decision to deny Sydney man Ganesh Sahathevan admission as a lawyer. Nor would either say which of the 10 members of the LPAB, three of whom are serving NSW Supreme Court judges, was on the deciding panel.
Ms Pritchard has left her role at the LPAB since The Australian began making inquiries in September. The article, published in December 2017 on website The Third Force, accuses Mr Sahathevan of engaging in a conspiracy to attack then Malaysian prime minister Najib Razak.
Mahathir Mohamad, who returned as prime minister after toppling Mr Najib in elections held last May, is also smeared as a participant in the globe-spanning conspiracy.
Mr Najib was under pressure at the time over the country’s sovereign wealth fund, 1MDB, which the US Department of Justice says has been looted of billions of dollars that was spent on property, art, jewels and the Leonardo DiCaprio film, The Wolf of Wall Street.
Malaysian authorities have charged Mr Najib with dozens of corruption offences that could attract decades in jail over his role in the 1MDB scandal, which allegedly included the flow of about $US1 billion through his personal bank account.
The article’s author, Malaysian political operative and Najib loyalist Raggie Jessy, also accused Rewcastle-Brown, Stein and Besser of receiving money, totalling millions of dollars, to participate in a Four Corners program exposing the 1MDB scandal that aired on the ABC in March 2016.
There is no suggestion any of Mr Jessy’s bizarre allegations are true. However, the LPAB cited the piece when denying Mr Sahathevan admission as a lawyer in an undated and unsigned set of reasons sent to him on August 3 last year.
It used the article as evidence in a passage dealing with legal conflicts between Mr Sahathevan, who has largely worked in the past as a journalist, his former employer, Malaysia’s Sun Media Group, and the company’s owner, tycoon Vincent Tan.
In that context, the board said the Third Force article reported “that Mr Sahathevan was investigated for blackmail, extortion, bribery and defamation”. While the article claims that blackmail, extortion, bribery and defamation “are but some of the transgressions many from around the world attribute” to Mr Sahathevan, The Australian was unable to find any reference in it to an investigation into him on these grounds.
It is unclear why the board felt the need to rely on the article, as it also made adverse findings about Mr Sahathevan’s character based on a series of other allegations including that he used “threatening and intimidating” language in emails to the College of Law and the NSW Attorney General and did not disclose his sacking from a previous job to the board.
Mr Sahathevan has denied the allegations in correspondence with the board. The board also cited evidence that one of Mr Sahathevan’s blogs on Malaysian politics was banned by the Najib regime as indicating his poor character.
In an email to Chief Justice Bathurst, sent on August 30, Rewcastle-Brown said her site, Sarawak Report, which exposed much of the 1MDB scandal, was banned by the Malaysian government.
“I along with other critics of the 1MDB scandal (which includes Mr Sahathevan) became the target of immense state-backed vilification, intimidation and online defamation campaigns on behalf of the Malaysian government,” she said.
She said the board’s use of the Third Force article against Mr Sahathevan displayed “a troubling level of misjudgment and poor quality research, giving a strong impression that someone seeking to find reasons to disqualify this candidate simply went through the internet looking for ‘dirt’ against him”.
“The Third Force has consistently been by far the most outlandish, libellous, vicious and frankly ludicrous of all the publications that were commissioned as part of former prime minister Najib Razak’s self-proclaimed ‘cyber army’ which he paid (and continues to pay) to defame his perceived enemies and critics,” she said.
Besser, who now works in the ABC’s London bureau, told The Australian: “It’s clearly nonsense and comes from the darkest corners of some pretty wild Malaysian conspiracy theorists.”Mr Sahathevan’s application is to be reconsidered at an LPAB meeting next month.
News Ltd.

Document AUSTLN0020190116ef1h0003

That ordinary Australian university student politics can harm trade with China demonstrates why Peter Varghese & Andrew Robb's China FTA is a bad deal: Varghese must be removed as UQ Chancellor, must not be allowed to trash Australian university traditions in order to defend his legacy

by Ganesh Sahathevan




                         

                                           Australian national interest better served by the removal of
                                                               Peter Varghese as UQ Chancellor



In praise of his work the then  Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr Peter N Varghese AO declared in 2015: 

"ChAFTA is a remarkably good deal for Australia and the best deal that China has done with any partner to date.ChAFTA will make a real difference to the livelihoods of Australian farmers and producers".

The claim that the China-Australia Free Trade deal (ChAFTA) is "the best" that China has done with any country is interesting. Given the position that Australia finds itself in today where it would seem that nothing can be decided in the national interest 

Varghese worked on that deal with his minister, the then Minister for Trade and Investment, Andrew Robb.  That Robb agreed to Chinese workers effectively taking the place of local workers on Australian construction sites, in order to get the deal done, says much of Robb's incompetence. That he then went on to work for the PLA linked Landbridge says much about his loyalties. 

That ordinary student politics at UQ  can be seen to harm UQ's  business relationship with China provides further evidence that the ChAFTA was a bad deal to begin with. That Varghese finds himself in a position where he has to deal with the consequences of his work is poetic. He must not however be allowed to use his position to defend his legacy, and in the process ruin the tradition we have in Australian universities of open and vigorous debate, no matter how unruly or offensive it may seem. 
Varghese must go,and Pavlou be provded all the backing he needs to ensure that the perpetrators of the so-called "disciplinary action" against him are removed from the tertiary education system.

END 

TO BE READ WITH 

Peter Varghese has been wrong about Iran, jihadis in SEA, and now China: Australia's national interest better served by the activism of UQ student Drew Pavlou, not UQ Chancellor Peter Varghese. Australians should seek Varghese's removal as UQ Chancellor

Sunday, May 17, 2020

Public exchanges between AG Idris Harun & predecessor Tommy Thomas raise even more questions about Malaysia's 1MDB investigation and prosecution of Najib Razak: Crucial evidence of the paper trail seems to have been ignored, and nothing done to investigate and recover 1MDB funds

by Ganesh Sahathevan


                                                                     
           Why were Riza Aziz's offer of a plea bargain even considered? Why has not more been done to recover all and any assets he might have that can be traced back to 1MDB money


In the latest chapter of the public debate between Malaysia's current Attorney General Idris Harun and his predecessor Tommy Thomas, Thomas has said in a second press release issued on 18 May 2020: 

I took into account the benefits of the AMLA Act 2001 when I decided

 to charge Riza Aziz in July 2019 with 5 money laundering offences punishable under Section 4(1) of that Act for receiving proceeds of unlawful activities, between April 2011 and November 2012, totalling USD248 million of monies belonging to 1MDB. I was satisfied that the prosecution had a very strong case to establish the ingredients of the offences. The documentary trail was substantial and highly credible.


Tan Sri Idrus states that “Malaysia is expected to recover approximately USD108 million”. With the greatest of respect, this is a red herring. By personal diplomacy, we established strong relations with DOJ after I took office. They have returned billions of ringgit, and more monies may be released in future by DOJ. The purpose of prosecuting Riza was not to strengthen our chances of securing monies from DOJ. DOJ would have rettourned(sic) these monies in any event because it belongs to Malaysia and was stolen from Malaysia. Riza is not offering to pay any new money or monies from any source other than DOJ seized assets. The USD108 million, would in any event be returned by DOJ to Malaysia. Thus, Riza is unnecessarily getting credit for returning monies that are not his. Hence, it is a sweetheart deal for Riza but terrible for Malaysia.



Readers are reminded that the paper trail with regards Riza Aziz begins in Malaysia and from 1MDB. The paper trial can be deconstructed into two or three separate phases, the first phase being the initial theft from 1MDB for which Najib Razak has been charged and is being tried. 

However, the prosecution in the Najib Razak SRC and 1MDB trials have never made any reference to a clear paper trail, relying instead on a galaxy of witnesses to prove their point. 
Despite the fact that the DOJ had done much of the work in establishing the paper trail and seizing the assets DOJ officers were never called as witnesses, and their investigation papers never entered into evidence.  
If the prosecution had a very strong case against Riza, then the case against Najib should be by definition and in relative terms, open ans shut, concluded a long time ago.This has clearly not been the case and instead the public has been kept entertained by defense counsel Shafee Abdullah's playing the trial judges for fools, almost literally like performing dogs.
It was not his fault that he did so but that of the prosecution who seemed unable to present a precise, clear line of attack.

Additionally, it does appear from Thomas's press statement that the Malaysian Government seemed uninterested in pursuing any investigation of its own, happy instead to rely on the DOJ's work. This is curious, for the best evidence was always going to be in Malaysia, and out of the DOJ's reach. As this writer pointed out last year:

PM Mahathir need only look to AMMB and ANZ in his quest to recovers all monies stolen by Jho Low-More on what else Malaysia should do, but is not ....



The above suggests that there is something very wrong at the Attorney General's Chambers, and this was evident as early as 31 January 2020 while Thomas was still AG. Despite the stated objective of seeking a custodial sentence with significant penalties against Riza, Deputy Public Prosecutor Norzilati Izhani Zainal informed Sessions Court judge Rozina Ayob on that date that the AGC was considering Riza's representation's submitted to the AGC on 18 November 2019. From what we now know of the representation, the AGC ought to have rejected it without further consideration. Thomas has said as much in his latest press release.
Are we to believe DPP 
Norzilati Izhani Zainal was off on a frolic of
her own? 

END 

TO BE READ WITH 
Press Release Dated 18 May 2020 Issued By Former Attorney General Tommy Thomas


1. As I have been mentioned on numerous occasions in the media release issued yesterday by my successor, Tan Sri Idrus bin Harun, I have to put the record straight a second time.

2. I took into account the benefits of the AMLA Act 2001 when I decided to charge Riza Aziz in July 2019 with 5 money laundering offences punishable under Section 4(1) of that Act for receiving proceeds of unlawful activities, between April 2011 and November 2012, totalling USD248 million of monies belonging to 1MDB. I was satisfied that the prosecution had a very strong case to establish the ingredients of the offences. The documentary trail was substantial and highly credible. Upon conviction, the prosecution would have invited the trial judge to impose a sentence commensurate with the severity of the offences, the maximum being 15 years for each charge. But more significantly, the criminal court is given power by Parliament to additionally impose a penalty up to 5 times the amount involved in the unlawful activities, that is 5 times USD248 million, which would work out to some USD1.2 billion. We would have sought this sum upon his conviction.

3. As Public Prosecutor, I personally decided to prosecute about 25 cases. In each of these cases, I was briefed by MACC or the police and DPPs. I probed deeply. My decision-making process took time. From my trial experience, evidence gathering continues from initiation of proceedings until completion of trial. Only when I was satisfied that the prosecution could secure a conviction, did I make the decision to prosecute. It was always a deliberate and properly analysed decision. That same rigour was brought to the decision to prosecute Riza. In none of these 25 odd cases, did I consider favourably a request by any accused to settle on such terribly poor terms to the prosecution. That would have called into question the wisdom and integrity of my decision to prosecute in the first place.

4. In paragraph 2 of Tan Sri Idrus’s media release, reference is made to a minute I made on 19 November 2019 to Datuk Seri Gopal Sri Ram on the letter dated 18 November 2019 from Riza’s solicitors. That indeed was my style. After having read that letter, I wrote a couple of words or sentences to him. I have no access to the original letter with my handwriting. Because of this handicap, I cannot comment on it.

5. What is abundantly clear is that I did not make any decision in relation to Riza’s representation up to the date of my resignation, 28 February 2020. A decision of this importance involving billions of ringgit and significant public interest would be made by me in writing. I did not, and none exist.

6. With regard to communications with the 2 major actors, my successor and Datuk Seri Gopal Sri Ram, the position is as follows. I have not communicated with Tan Sri Idrus since 28 February 2020. This is not unusual. I did not communicate with my predecessor during my tenure. I spoke on a couple of occasions with Datuk Seri Gopal Sri Ram over the telephone between 28 February and 14 May 2020, but this subject was never raised by him. Hence after my resignation, I was kept in the dark on this and all other matters.

7. In Paragraph 3 of the media release, Tan Sri Idrus states that “Malaysia is expected to recover approximately USD108 million”. With the greatest of respect, this is a red herring. By personal diplomacy, we established strong relations with DOJ after I took office. They have returned billions of ringgit, and more monies may be released in future by DOJ. The purpose of prosecuting Riza was not to strengthen our chances of securing monies from DOJ. DOJ would have returned these monies in any event because it belongs to Malaysia and was stolen from Malaysia. Riza is not offering to pay any new money or monies from any source other than DOJ seized assets. The USD108 million, would in any event be returned by DOJ to Malaysia. Thus, Riza is unnecessarily getting credit for returning monies that are not his. Hence, it is a sweetheart deal for Riza but terrible for Malaysia.

8. Finally, even the timing of Riza’s DNAA is bizarre. In both civil and criminal proceedings which proceed to trial, a plaintiff or the prosecution loses substantial leverage over the adverse party if it withdraws court proceeding before the terms of settlement are completely performed. This is elementary. Hence, one needs to question why Riza has been given a DNAA so prematurely.

9. Since Tan Sri Idrus is at pains to emphasize the weight he gave to my so called ‘agreement in principle’ (which itself is a fiction), let me state publicly that I would have never sanctioned this deal. I would have lost all credibility in the eyes of the people of Malaysia whom I endeavoured to serve as public prosecutor to the best of my ability, honestly and professionally if I had approved it. I would have betrayed the trust the Prime Minister and the PH government had reposed in me.

Tan Sri Tommy Thomas
18 May 2020

Saturday, May 16, 2020

Zhu Minshen's share buybacks raise additional questions about the NSW LPAB 's decision to grant Zhu the "one and only" license to grant law degrees: FEE HELP funded share buybacks call for an investigation by the Commonwealth into the conduct of the NSW LPAB and Chairman Tom Bathurst

by Ganesh Sahathevan



Top Education Group Ltd
HKG: 1752


Following
0.30 HKD 0.00 
15 May, 4:08 pm GMT+8 · Disclaimer



Open0.30
High0.30
Low0.28
Mkt cap744.10M
P/E ratio37.17
Div yield1.33%
Prev close0.30
52-wk high0.38
52-wk low0.24

Web results



Zhu Minshen's Top Group share price collapsed immediately after its IPO on the HKEX, but this did not seem to bother the relevant Australian authorities. The issue was raised on this blog in May last year:

Top Education Group share price movements require explanation from NSW LPAB, TEQSA,and AG Speakman; Top's declining cash flow from operations adds to worries


In fact these issues did not seem to bother the NSW Legal Profession Admission Board, and  its chairman, the Chief Justice Of  NSW  Tom Bathurst, when they renewed Zhu and Top's license.

Commonwealth funding via FEE HELP  funds Top Group's operations,in part,given Top's strategy of enrolling local students.In fact, enrollment of law students whose ATAR would not be acceptable to the normal university based law schools is part of the Top strategy.That strategy,and the decision of the NSW LPAB drew criticism from students and industry:

Elvira Naiman, managing director at legal recruitment firm Naiman Clarke Legal, went even further, saying: “I'm surprised that anyone in their right mind would think that an additional law school in NSW is a good idea.”

She added: “There are too many law schools in NSW. There is no question about that.”

There are currently around 13 law schools in NSW. TOP Education Institute’s law school was given approval by NSW Legal Practice Admission Board in April and will launch in 2016.

The law school is looking to attract students from schools in Western Sydney. It will be based in the Australian Technology Park with an ATAR requirement of 85.

Candidates will also be interviewed to assist in determining their suitability to undertake the program.

Ms Naiman doubted that school leavers with an ATAR of 85 would have the academic rigour to excel in the study and practise of law.

The FEE HELP revenue finances the whole company, including share buybacks which have kept Top Group's share price from collapsing even further. The extent of the buybacks can be analysed from the data below which has been compiled and published on Hong Kong's well regarded Webb-Site. It is obvious that Top has an ongoing program of share buybacks, which seems to be designed to support its share price,and market capitalization. 

This abuse of FEE HELP revenue calls for investigation by the Commonwealth and in particular the Minister For Education Dan Tehan.A proper investigation will not be complete without an investigation into the NSW LPAB and all its officers, including its chairman. The fact that the chairman of the LPAB is also Chief Justice of NSW is irrelevant. These issues concern the conduct of the Chairman of the NSW LPAB. 

TO BE READ WITH

Buybacks

Note: the numbers of shares and average prices are original data, not adjusted for stock splits, consolidations, bonus issues or other changes. Off-market buybacks are excluded. In the daily list, click on the date to see CCASS movements on the settlement date.


RowDate/
period
NumberValueCurr.Av.
price
12020-05-14280,00083,150HKD0.297
22020-05-13560,000161,600HKD0.289
32020-05-12100,00028,500HKD0.285
42020-05-11760,000213,900HKD0.281
52020-05-08510,000143,300HKD0.281
62020-05-07190,00052,700HKD0.277
72020-05-06290,00078,950HKD0.272
82020-05-05430,000116,250HKD0.270
92020-05-04410,000108,950HKD0.266
102020-04-29140,00036,950HKD0.264
112020-04-28120,00030,600HKD0.255
122020-04-27220,00055,600HKD0.253
132020-04-24300,00075,850HKD0.253
142020-04-23250,00063,550HKD0.254
152020-04-22190,00047,900HKD0.252
162020-04-21630,000158,400HKD0.251
172020-04-20250,00063,700HKD0.255
182020-04-17370,00093,100HKD0.252
192020-04-16840,000209,410HKD0.249
202020-04-152,100,000523,140HKD0.249
212020-04-14430,000107,910HKD0.251
222020-04-09120,00030,600HKD0.255
232020-04-08170,00043,200HKD0.254
242020-04-07280,00070,550HKD0.252
252020-04-06180,00045,900HKD0.255
262020-04-03270,00068,450HKD0.254
272020-04-02210,00053,150HKD0.253
282020-04-01380,00097,000HKD0.255
292020-03-311,150,000293,800HKD0.255
302020-03-30880,000221,350HKD0.252
312020-03-27230,00058,650HKD0.255
322020-03-26130,00033,150HKD0.255
332020-03-25690,000176,150HKD0.255
342020-03-24350,00089,750HKD0.256
352020-03-23690,000173,700HKD0.252
362020-03-20590,000153,050HKD0.259
372020-03-192,230,000566,750HKD0.254
382020-03-18450,000119,650HKD0.266
392020-03-17810,000211,900HKD0.262
402020-03-161,910,000502,580HKD0.263
412020-03-13360,00092,650HKD0.257
422020-03-12240,00065,100HKD0.271
432020-03-11320,00090,050HKD0.281
442020-03-10430,000118,750HKD0.276
452020-03-09500,000141,300HKD0.283
462020-03-06600,000176,700HKD0.295
472020-03-05800,000229,340HKD0.287
482020-03-04950,000272,100HKD0.286
492020-03-031,100,000332,600HKD0.302
502020-03-021,170,000359,060HKD0.307
512020-01-24100,00027,950HKD0.280
522020-01-23760,000209,500HKD0.276
532020-01-221,420,000391,950HKD0.276
542020-01-21380,000107,100HKD0.282
552020-01-20430,000121,000HKD0.281
562020-01-17300,00085,650HKD0.286
572020-01-16520,000148,300HKD0.285
582020-01-15150,00042,600HKD0.284
592020-01-14310,00088,150HKD0.284
602020-01-13420,000120,300HKD0.286
612020-01-10360,000103,050HKD0.286
622020-01-09330,00094,650HKD0.287
632020-01-08140,00040,600HKD0.290
642020-01-07140,00040,850HKD0.292
652020-01-0670,00020,650HKD0.295
662020-01-03120,00035,450HKD0.295
672020-01-02710,000209,600HKD0.295
682019-12-31240,00071,250HKD0.297
692019-12-30400,000118,800HKD0.297
702019-12-27260,00077,400HKD0.298
712019-12-24170,00050,550HKD0.297
722019-12-23610,000177,750HKD0.291
732019-12-201,190,000345,950HKD0.291
742019-12-19180,00053,100HKD0.295
752019-12-18170,00050,400HKD0.296
762019-12-17920,000272,000HKD0.296
772019-12-1670,00020,650HKD0.295
782019-12-13330,00096,300HKD0.292
792019-12-12800,000232,900HKD0.291
802019-12-11390,000113,850HKD0.292
812019-12-10860,000250,100HKD0.291
822019-12-0940,00012,000HKD0.300
832019-12-06710,000210,750HKD0.297
842019-12-05650,000192,450HKD0.296
852019-12-04420,000122,400HKD0.291
862019-12-03630,000183,250HKD0.291
872019-11-29970,000282,650HKD0.291
882019-11-28410,000119,600HKD0.292
892019-11-271,270,000367,900HKD0.290
902019-11-26380,000110,950HKD0.292
912019-11-25770,000224,600HKD0.292
922019-11-221,080,000319,900HKD0.296
932019-11-211,310,000379,750HKD0.290
942019-11-20570,000166,150HKD0.291
952019-11-19800,000235,800HKD0.295
962019-11-18340,000101,100HKD0.297
972019-11-15190,00056,750HKD0.299
982019-11-14290,00086,650HKD0.299
992019-11-13270,00080,150HKD0.297
1002019-11-12910,000272,350HKD0.299
1012019-11-11670,000198,500HKD0.296
1022019-11-08400,000120,500HKD0.301
1032019-11-07120,00035,500HKD0.296
1042019-11-05570,000169,250HKD0.297
1052019-11-04580,000172,650HKD0.298
1062019-11-01210,00061,600HKD0.293
1072019-10-31390,000114,050HKD0.292
1082019-10-30710,000208,100HKD0.293
1092019-10-2860,00016,500HKD0.275
1102019-10-25440,000121,850HKD0.277
1112019-10-24180,00050,400HKD0.280
1122019-10-23360,000101,700HKD0.283
1132019-10-22230,00065,500HKD0.285
1142019-10-21190,00053,600HKD0.282
1152019-10-18140,00039,750HKD0.284
1162019-10-1790,00025,650HKD0.285
1172019-10-16440,000123,800HKD0.281
1182019-10-1580,00022,800HKD0.285
1192019-10-14280,00080,850HKD0.289
1202019-10-11460,000133,650HKD0.291
1212019-10-1070,00020,300HKD0.290
1222019-10-09140,00040,750HKD0.291
1232019-10-04330,00094,600HKD0.287
1242019-10-03190,00052,750HKD0.278
1252019-10-02440,000119,450HKD0.271
1262019-09-30550,000149,500HKD0.272
1272019-08-16830,000271,150HKD0.327
1282019-08-15790,000249,900HKD0.316
1292019-08-14340,000110,900HKD0.326
1302019-08-13950,000304,600HKD0.321
1312019-08-12160,00051,900HKD0.324
1322019-08-09260,00084,150HKD0.324
1332019-08-08620,000199,500HKD0.322
1342019-08-071,030,000331,200HKD0.322
1352019-08-06440,000141,850HKD0.322
1362019-08-051,140,000374,750HKD0.329
1372019-08-02670,000230,300HKD0.344
1382019-08-01410,000142,400HKD0.347
1392019-07-31220,00076,450HKD0.348
1402019-07-30500,000173,600HKD0.347
1412019-07-29460,000161,000HKD0.350
1422019-07-26350,000123,600HKD0.353
1432019-07-25490,000172,950HKD0.353
1442019-07-24250,00088,450HKD0.354
1452019-07-23360,000127,000HKD0.353
1462019-07-22440,000155,300HKD0.353
1472019-07-19200,00071,000HKD0.355
1482019-07-18180,00063,000HKD0.350
1492019-07-17240,00083,050HKD0.346
1502019-07-16140,00048,050HKD0.343
1512019-07-15180,00060,000HKD0.333
1522019-07-12130,00042,900HKD0.330
1532019-07-11300,00098,250HKD0.328
1542019-07-10450,000147,700HKD0.328
1552019-07-09300,00099,050HKD0.330
1562019-07-08510,000168,750HKD0.331
1572019-07-05460,000152,750HKD0.332
1582019-07-04480,000160,100HKD0.334
1592019-07-031,150,000383,250HKD0.333
1602019-07-02360,000121,100HKD0.336
1612019-06-28700,000236,400HKD0.338
1622019-06-27480,000160,350HKD0.334
1632019-06-26190,00062,450HKD0.329
1642019-06-25290,00092,950HKD0.321
1652019-06-24360,000114,500HKD0.318
1662019-06-21580,000183,550HKD0.316
1672019-06-20270,00083,700HKD0.310
1682019-06-19510,000156,850HKD0.308
1692019-06-18670,000203,550HKD0.304
1702019-06-17190,00057,950HKD0.305
1712019-06-14410,000122,700HKD0.299
1722019-06-13310,00090,250HKD0.291
1732019-06-12250,00072,500HKD0.290
1742019-06-1180,00022,800HKD0.285
1752019-06-10330,00092,300HKD0.280
1762019-06-06410,000111,500HKD0.272
1772019-06-05460,000122,300HKD0.266
1782019-06-04350,00092,550HKD0.264
1792019-06-0370,00018,550HKD0.265
1802019-05-31110,00029,150HKD0.265
1812019-05-30280,00072,750HKD0.260
1822019-05-291,250,000314,260HKD0.251
1832019-03-05230,00088,000HKD0.383
1842019-03-0490,00032,350HKD0.359
1852019-03-01200,00071,950HKD0.360
1862019-01-25550,000174,750HKD0.318
1872019-01-24160,00050,400HKD0.315
1882019-01-23290,00092,150HKD0.318
1892019-01-22200,00064,100HKD0.321
1902019-01-21170,00055,150HKD0.324
1912019-01-18160,00051,900HKD0.324
1922019-01-17260,00084,650HKD0.326
1932019-01-1650,00016,300HKD0.326
1942019-01-15240,00076,250HKD0.318
1952019-01-14150,00047,850HKD0.319
1962019-01-11150,00047,950HKD0.320
1972019-01-10150,00047,350HKD0.316
1982019-01-09410,000130,750HKD0.319
1992019-01-0890,00028,800HKD0.320
2002019-01-0790,00029,200HKD0.324
2012019-01-04540,000174,850HKD0.324
2022019-01-03400,000127,250HKD0.318
2032019-01-02490,000156,800HKD0.320
2042018-12-31900,000287,500HKD0.319
2052018-12-28570,000179,550HKD0.315
2062018-12-27950,000296,250HKD0.312
2072018-12-24890,000262,750HKD0.295
2082018-12-21870,000252,100HKD0.290
2092018-12-20840,000240,150HKD0.286
2102018-12-191,590,000464,450HKD0.292
2112018-12-181,020,000305,200HKD0.299
2122018-12-171,090,000340,450HKD0.312
2132018-12-142,270,000718,700HKD0.317
2142018-12-13600,000187,450HKD0.312
2152018-12-121,510,000462,150HKD0.306
2162018-12-112,200,000669,000HKD0.304
2172018-12-101,800,000542,800HKD0.302
2182018-12-07390,000120,200HKD0.308
2192018-12-061,530,000449,200HKD0.294
2202018-12-051,650,000487,900HKD0.296
2212018-12-04230,00069,000HKD0.300
2222018-12-03360,000109,200HKD0.303
2232018-11-30180,00055,550HKD0.309
2242018-11-29160,00049,450HKD0.309
2252018-11-28100,00031,500HKD0.315
2262018-11-27490,000152,900HKD0.312
2272018-11-26300,00093,350HKD0.311
2282018-11-23290,00090,550HKD0.312
2292018-11-22110,00034,600HKD0.315
2302018-11-21290,00090,350HKD0.312
2312018-11-20340,000104,550HKD0.308
2322018-11-19210,00066,100HKD0.315
2332018-11-16320,00099,000HKD0.309
2342018-11-15270,00086,550HKD0.321
2352018-11-1490,00028,400HKD0.316
2362018-11-13190,00059,400HKD0.313
2372018-11-12200,00065,550HKD0.328
2382018-11-09160,00053,750HKD0.336
2392018-11-0760,00019,700HKD0.328
2402018-11-0650,00016,300HKD0.326
2412018-11-0510,0003,150HKD0.315
2422018-11-0230,0009,350HKD0.312
2432018-11-0180,00024,400HKD0.305
2442018-10-3190,00027,050HKD0.301
2452018-10-30170,00050,150HKD0.295
Total116,000,00034,265,6000.295