Saturday, June 3, 2023

Ben Robert-Smith: What did CDF and former COA Angus Campbell do to protect Australian soldiers who served in Afghanistan from the threat of Pakistan's ISI

by Ganesh Sahathevan 



                                                        CDF Angus Campbell
                                                            

In the matter of Ben Robert- Smith and the finding of murder (on a balance of probabilities by a judge deciding a matter of defamation) the fact that the war in Afghanistan was a war against Pakistan's Inter-Intelligence Services (ISI) has been largely ignored by everyone including Angus Campbell , the former Chief Of Army and Chief Of Defence Force, who has remained silent on the matter of the quality of intelligence provided the SAS and other Australian troops who served in Afghanistan.

That the ISI managed the Taliban in Afghanistan is uncontroversial, and the facts well known.


B. Raman,  head of the counter-terrorism division of India's  Research and Analysis Wing wriitng in 2010 illustrated how Pkaistan's ISI managed the Taliban in its war against US ,NATO and Australian trroops in Afghamistan:


The well-publicised arrests by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the supposed No.2 of the Afghan Taliban, and two other senior Taliban leaders Mullah Abdul Salam and Mullah Mohammad Mir have not had any impact on the morale of the Afghan Taliban fighters confronting the 15.000---strong US led NATO cum Afghan National Army troops, which launched an offensive on February 13,2010, to wrest control over the Marjah area of the southern Helmand province from the Afghan Taliban.

 

2. While it has been confirmed that Mulla Baradar was captured in Karachi on the basis of intelligence collected by the US agencies, it is not yet clear where the other Afghan Taliban leaders were captured. According to some reports, Mulla Salam was captured from Faislabad in Pakistani Punjab, while Mulla Mir was captured  in BalochistanAcording to some other reports , both were captured in the madrasa at Akora Khattak, near Peshawar, run by Maulana Samiul Haq, the Amir of one of the factions of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam Pakistan.

 

3. There have been some other arrests of middle-level office-bearers of the Afghan Taliban in Karachi. These arrests have been projected by many American analysts, including Bruce Riedel, formerly of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as a possible game-changer and indicator of a welcome Pakistani decision to co-operate sincerely with the US against the Afghan Taliban.

 

4. These projections have not been borne out by reports from well-informed police sources in Karachi, which describe these arrests  as a manoeuvre by the ISI  to discard the well-identified leaders of the Afghan Taliban and usher in a new leadership consisting of well-motivated and well-trained recruits of recent vintage, who have not yet come to the notice of the US agencies.

 

5. They say that the leaders arrested since January-end in Karachi and other parts of Pakistan no longer constituted the command and control of the Afghan Taliban and that is why their arrests have not yet had any impact on the operations of the Afghan Taliban on the ground----either in the Helmand province or elsewhere. They say that the Taliban forces presently resisting the US-led offensive in the Helmand province are led by a new crop of leaders devoted to Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Afghan Taliban, but capable of operating independently without the need for directions from a central command and  control.

 

6. The Taliban forces in the Helmand province have been following the same tactics as the Taliban had followed in the past and as Al Qaeda had followed in Tora Bora. This tactics consists of the bulk of the forces withdrawing from  the battle zone into Pakistan or dispersing to their native villages, while a smaller number stayed put in the battle zone to inflict casualties and equipment damage to the advancing US-led troops and make their “victory” pyrrhic.

 

7.Though it is now a week since the battle started, the advance made by the US-led forces has been expectedly slow. This is partly due to the large planting of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and landmines by the Taliban along the expected route of advance of the US-led troops and partly due to the resistance to the advance put up by the Taliban forces still in the battle zone.

 

8. During the first week of the fighting,  11 NATO troops and one Afghan soldier have been killed in the operation, according to the International Security Assistance Force. The Afghan authorities have claimed that  at least 40 Taliban fighters were killed in and around Marjah.

 

9.The repeated allegations by the NATO forces that the Taliban has been using civilians as “human shields” in order to slow down the NATO advance speak of the difficulties faced by the NATO forces. Major-General Nick Carter, of the British Army, has been quoted as saying: "I guess it will take us another 25 to 30 days to be entirely sure that we have secured that  which needs to be secured and we will probably won't know for about 120 days whether or not the population is entirely convinced by the degree of commitment that their Government is showing to them. So I guess looking downstream, in three months time or thereabouts we should have a pretty fair idea of about whether we have been successful. "

 

10. In their media briefings, US spin-masters have been projecting the entire operation as carried out  on the orders and under the political leadership of President Hamid Karzai, who is being projected as being in the driving seat of the operation. In a report carried on February 19,2010,the “Wall Street Journal” described how Gen.Stanley McChrystal , the US Commander, obtained the approval of President Hamid Karzai before launching the operation. It reported:  “Gen. McChrystal said: "Mr. President, tonight is the night the operation needs to happen. I need your permission to go." Mr. Karzai paused, remarked that it was first time anyone had ever asked him to make such a decision, and gave his assent.”

 

11.Mr.Karzai apparently did not suspect that the Americans wanted to show him as being in the driving seat so that they could blame him tomorrow  if the operation failed. A victory in the operation will be Mr.Obama’s, but a defeat will be Mr.Karzai’s.  (21-2-10)

(ISI & AFGHAN TALIBAN: DISCARDING THE OLD & USHERING IN  THE NEW

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO. 621 B.RAMAN)



Raman was not alone in his findings. Matt Waldman,Fellow, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University wrote in 2010:


Abstract Many accounts of the Afghan conflict misapprehend the nature of the relationship between Pakistan’s security services and the insurgency. The relationship, in fact, goes far beyond contact and coexistence, with some assistance provided by elements within, or linked to, Pakistan’s intelligence service (ISI) or military. Although the Taliban has a strong endogenous impetus, according to Taliban commanders the ISI orchestrates, sustains and strongly influences the movement. They say it gives sanctuary to both Taliban and Haqqani groups, and provides huge support in terms of training, funding, munitions, and supplies. In their words, this is ‘as clear as the sun in the sky’. Directly or indirectly the ISI appears to exert significant influence on the strategic decisionmaking and field operations of the Taliban; and has even greater sway over Haqqani insurgents. According to both Taliban and Haqqani commanders, it controls the most violent insurgent units, some of which appear to be based in Pakistan. Insurgent commanders confirmed that the ISI are even represented, as participants or observers, on the Taliban supreme leadership council, known as the Quetta Shura, and the Haqqani command council. Indeed, the agency appears to have circumscribed the Taliban’s strategic autonomy, precluding steps towards talks with the Afghan government through recent arrests. President Zardari himself has apparently assured captive, senior Taliban leaders that they are ‘our people’ and have his backing. He has also apparently authorised their release from prison. The ISI even arrested and then released two Taliban leaders, Qayyum Zakir, the movement’s new military commander, and Mullah Abdul Raouf Khadem, reportedly now head of the Quetta Shura, who are among the three or four highest ranking in the movement below Mullah Omar. Pakistan’s apparent involvement in a double-game of this scale could have major geopolitical implications and could even provoke US counter-measures. However, the powerful role of the ISI, and parts of the Pakistani military, suggests that progress against the Afghan insurgency, or towards political engagement, requires their support. The only sure way to secure such cooperation is to address the fundamental causes of Pakistan’s insecurity, especially its latent and enduring conflict with India. 




Australian reporting on Ben Robert -Smith is silent on this significant, underlying factor of the war in Afghanistan. CDF Angus Campbell is part of that silent chorus,when he should in fact inform Australia and the world if he was aware of that fact, and what if anything he did protect Australia's soldiers including the SAS from the threat of the ISI.

END



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