Australia's judges seem not to understand that rules of evidence are irrelevant in matters of intelligence and national security: ASPI analysis of Zhenhua surveillance can help Their Honours understand why they have been compromised and how brother & sister judges who have chosen to participate in extra-judicial matters may have added to their predicament

 by Ganesh Sahathevan 

From left to right: Prof Eugene Clark, Hon George Brandis, Dr Minshen Zhu

The Zhenhua database included a number of Australian judges, and their families.  The consequences as explained by the Australian Strategic  Policy Institute (ASPI) Micheal Shoebridge: 

But the data is open source, so doesn’t that mean it’s okay?

No. The data may be ‘on the internet’ but it’s likely that laws on data access and sharing—such as the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation and privacy principles like those here in Australia, as well as commercial policies and terms—have been wilfully broken to assemble the datasets. Data obtained from the dark web is the most likely to have breached such laws and rules. It’s even more likely laws will be broken by Chinese state entities using the datasets.

And, even if the data is all out there on the internet, aggregating it is a whole different thing. Aggregating lets you see meaning and patterns that are invisible when the information is fragmented and scattered around the globe.

 As to what can be done with that data:

The insights from these datasets are valuable for powering foreign interference by Chinese actors in other states and societies. They are the fuel for Chinese state entities’ covert and corrupting activities, and give these entities an advantage over others. Companies armed with these insights from government can use them to take advantage of competitors and business partners.

The judges trade union, the Judicial Council of Australia (JCA) , told the AFR in response to queries about the list and its consequences: 

A spokesman for the judges' union – the Judicial Council of Australia – said if the list were to be used to undermine that confidence (in the judiciary) , that would be concerning. However, it was not aware of any such usage.

While that response might suffice in a courtroom where the rules of evidence applicable to the court and jurisdiction can take precedence over truth, those rules are wholly and totally irrelevant in matters of intelligence and national security where all that matters is data. 

The judges on the list, and quite likely those not on the list, have been compromised as a result of China's surveillance. Making matters worse is the fact of a number of judges choosing to make extrajudicial comment, and even involve themselves in international affairs. Some examples, as reported on this blog: 

The Economist says Gulen "did much to cripple democracy" in Turkey: Questions for Gulen's high level supporters in Australia, including senior judges, politicians, vice-regal appointees........

Tinker tailor lawyer spy: Secrets of judicial officers spied on may be exploited by thief

 Chinese spies expelled but Communist Partly linked Zhu Minshen & Top Group remain part of NSW & Australia's legal infrastructure, despite historic ASIO, AFP concerns: Singapore's Nanyang Uni strategy provides a solution to the problem , NSW LPAB & Chairman Tom Bathurst who issued and re-issued Zhu's license are part of the problem, must not be granted any immunity from investigation, penalties

 

The stories above demonstrate how Australia's judges have been compromised, and may in fact have contributed to the problem. A solution is required, and it would probably require the resignation of those  exposed.

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