Malayan Law Journal Reports/1977/Volume 2/DATUK HAJI HARUN BIN HAJI IDRIS v PUBLICPROSECUTOR - [1977] 2 MLJ 155 - 10 June 1977
25 pages[1977] 2 MLJ 155
DATUK HAJI HARUN BIN HAJI IDRIS v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
FC KUALA LUMPURSUFFIAN LP, ALI HAMAN AND WAN SULEIMAN FJJFEDERAL COURT CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 19 OF 197621-25, 28-31 MARCH 1977, 1-4, 6 APRIL 1977, 10 June 1977
Criminal Law and Procedure --
Transfer of case from subordinate court to High Court on certificate of Attorney-General
-- Whether legal -- Whether section 418A Criminal Procedure Code ultra vires
the Constitution -- Corruption -- Admission of statement to police
-- Evidence of other possible offences, wrongly admitted --
Evidence of system -- Evidence Act, 1950, ss 15, 24, 29, 54 -- Criminal
Procedure Code (FMS Cap 6), ss 138, 177, 417 and 418A -- Fedederal
Constitution, Articles 4(1) and 8 Bribery and Corruption -- Whether
accused solicited gratification -- Whether gratification was solicited corruptly
-- Gratification solicited as inducement to obtain approval of application
for State land -- Whether accused solicited and accepted money
corruptly -- Whether accused "agent" -- Prevention of Corruption Act,1961,
ss 3, 4 and 9 Constitutional Law -- Legislation giving discretion to Attorney-General
to issue certificate for transfer of case from subordinate
court to High Court -- Whether contrary to Federal Constitution -- Right to
Equality -- Federal Constitution Articles 4(1) and 8.
This was an appeal from the
decision of Raja Azlan Shah FJ. ( [1977] 1 MLJ 15).The appellant had beenconvicted
on three charges of corruption, in that he as Mentri Besar
of Selangor (a) solicited the sum of$250,000 for U.M.N.O. as an inducement
to obtain the approval of the Executive Council in respect of anapplication
for a piece of State land; (b) being a member of a public body accepted for
U.M.N.O. the sum of$25,000 as inducement to obtain such approval and (c)
accepted for U.M.N.O. the sum of $225,000 as aninducement to obtain such
approval.The learned trial judge sentenced the appellant to one year's
imprisonment in respect of the first charge and2 years' imprisonment
in respect of each of the second and third charges, all the
sentences to runconcurrently. He also ordered payment of the
sum of $225,000 to U.M.N.O.Selangor. The appellantappealed.On
appeal it was argued (a) that section 418A of the Criminal
Procedure Code (under the provisions of whichthe case of the
appellant had been transferred from the subordinate court to the High
Court for trial) wasinconsistent with Article 8 and therefore
unconstitutional and void by virtue of Article 4; (b) that the
verdictwas not supported by such evidence as was admissible.
Held:
(1) section 418A of
the Criminal Procedure Code is not discriminatory, as although
it uses thewords "any particular case" it does not
apply specifically to the particular case against theaccused. The section
applies to all criminal cases triable in a subordinate court;(2) a
preliminary inquiry is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution; if
the accusedhad been tried in the Sessions Court he would not have had the
use of depositions before trial;Page 1
and at the trial in the High
Court he also enjoyed the chance of not being called upon for hisdefence at the
close of the case for the prosecution. By being tried in the High Court he did
notrun the risk of greater penalty, for if he had been tried in the Sessions
Court he would havebeen liable to the full penalty prescribed by law. In any
event the trial in the High Court followedthe same rules of procedure and
evidence as would have been followed in the Sessions Courtand so
there was no question of the accused being denied a fair and impartial trial.
Theaccused also had a right of appeal and a provision for appeal, it has been
held in the Indiancases, may cure any defect in the law;(3) even if
(contrary to the view of the court) the law may be regarded
as discriminatory, there wasreasonable classification in it, there was a
nexus between it and the object of the law and therewas a principle or policy
in it to guide the Attorney-General in the exercise of his
discretionunder section 418A. The Attorney-General when acting under
the section 418A will beexpected to transfer to the High Court
only cases of unusual difficulty or of unusual importance.Sections
417 and 418A of the Criminal Procedure Code are vehicles
for the Attorney-Generalto exercise his power under Article 145(3) of the
Federal Constitution and it is for him to judgewhich case is difficult or important
enough to be given an early trial after a transfer to the HighCourt under
section 418A;(4) it is obvious that the scheme of the amendments
to sections 138, 417 and 418A is to expediatetrials, and there is
an obvious classification, a classification clearly connected
with theunderlying principle of administration of justice that an
alleged criminal should be placed on trialas soon as possible after the
commission of the crime as the circumstances of the case wouldpermit and this
classification cannot be regarded as unreasonable and not having a nexus
withthe object of the amendments, namely speedy trial;(5) the statement made
by the appellant to the officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation wasadmissible by virtue of section 15(1) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1961 , and also byvirtue of section 29 of the Evidence Act which
provides that if a confession is otherwiseadmissible, that is, if the court is
satisfied that it is made voluntarily, it does not becomeinadmissible simply
because it was made in answer to questions which he need not haveanswered
whatever may have been the form of those questions;(6) evidence relating to
cheques paid by the appellant out of the U.M.N.O. Special
Fund to hispersonal account was wrongly admitted and should not have
been used to discredit theaccused, but in this case there was,
apart from that evidence, enough evidence to support thefinding of guilt;(7) evidence
of the receipt of other donations received by the appellant
was rightly admitted inevidence to rebut the defence that a voluntary
and honest donation had been given in thiscase;(8) there was enough evidence
to support the conviction as the evidence showed that theappellant
did solicit the $250,000 corrupty from the bank as an inducement
for the ExecutiveCouncil to approve the bank's application and that
he did accept the two sums corruptly;
1977 2 MLJ 155 at 156
(9) in the circumstances
of the case the appellant was an agent within the meaning of
section 4(a)of the Prevention of Corruption Act and he was correctly charged
on the alternative charges.However in the circumstances it would
not be proper or expedient to order the appellant to beconvicted
under that section also;(10) the penalty ordered by the learned trial
judge should have been ordered to be paid to theFederal Government.
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