by Ganesh Sahathevan
Robert Kuok's memoirs continue to provide more data on Malaysian Chinese business practises.His rather candid views can now be compared against what has been written elsewhere, and the results can be intriguing.
An example is this account of how the Brits viewed Robert Kuok:
In 1969, Rober tKuok was made chairman of MSA,....the remaining British interests in the company became frustrated with his management style.The UK's High Commissioner, Sir Michael Walker, learned that although Kuok had practically no experience of airline business, he interfered in operational matter which were 'no concern of his'. An example was Kuok's decision, without any consultation, to change MSA's insurance arrangements.. This proved 'entirely unsuitable' and had to be reversed at a cost of M$500,000 (nearly£68,000).
(Source: Nicholas J.White,British Business in Post-Colonial Malaysia, 1957-70: Neo-colonialism or Disengagement?)
This can now be compared to how Kuok views the Brits,and himself,as recounted in his memoirs:
When I was chairman (of MSA), the managing director and CEO was David Craig, who came from British Airways. I had acrimonious exchanges with him. He tried very hard to ingratiate himself into the good books of the Malaysian directors, since the Singapore directors were very rigid and severe managers.
Whenever David wasn’t performing, they were severe, and so he ran to the Malaysian side for protection. He found the Malaysian directors by and large convenient pillars behind which he could hide. I tried to haul him out from hiding, and our relationship soured. One day, I was in the MSA office on Robinson Road in Singapore, which was a much grander office space than my own humble sugartrading cubbyhole. David spoke to me about engaging expensive European expatriates for the airline. I asked what was wrong with engaging pilots from Burma, which at that time, under the military regime of Ne Win, was training pilots and sending some of them to aeronautical schools in England. He retorted, “Oh, no, no. Only British pilots are safe.” I pointed out that some of our commanders here were Chinese from the Malay Peninsula. He responded that there were too few. Then I suggested he try Indonesia, since Garuda was a relatively seasoned airline. He responded, “Ah, these guys land their planes in the ocean and in jungles and kill all their passengers.” I rounded on him: “Aren’t you being racist?” I noted that a Qantas or British Airways plane piloted by whites had crashed in Singapore’s Kallang Basin Airport. We had a very rough exchange. He had his agenda. When I took the job, I had no agenda whatsoever. I just wanted harmony between Malaysia and Singapore.
In 1969, Rober tKuok was made chairman of MSA,....the remaining British interests in the company became frustrated with his management style.The UK's High Commissioner, Sir Michael Walker, learned that although Kuok had practically no experience of airline business, he interfered in operational matter which were 'no concern of his'. An example was Kuok's decision, without any consultation, to change MSA's insurance arrangements.. This proved 'entirely unsuitable' and had to be reversed at a cost of M$500,000 (nearly£68,000).
(Source: Nicholas J.White,British Business in Post-Colonial Malaysia, 1957-70: Neo-colonialism or Disengagement?)
This can now be compared to how Kuok views the Brits,and himself,as recounted in his memoirs:
When I was chairman (of MSA), the managing director and CEO was David Craig, who came from British Airways. I had acrimonious exchanges with him. He tried very hard to ingratiate himself into the good books of the Malaysian directors, since the Singapore directors were very rigid and severe managers.
Whenever David wasn’t performing, they were severe, and so he ran to the Malaysian side for protection. He found the Malaysian directors by and large convenient pillars behind which he could hide. I tried to haul him out from hiding, and our relationship soured. One day, I was in the MSA office on Robinson Road in Singapore, which was a much grander office space than my own humble sugartrading cubbyhole. David spoke to me about engaging expensive European expatriates for the airline. I asked what was wrong with engaging pilots from Burma, which at that time, under the military regime of Ne Win, was training pilots and sending some of them to aeronautical schools in England. He retorted, “Oh, no, no. Only British pilots are safe.” I pointed out that some of our commanders here were Chinese from the Malay Peninsula. He responded that there were too few. Then I suggested he try Indonesia, since Garuda was a relatively seasoned airline. He responded, “Ah, these guys land their planes in the ocean and in jungles and kill all their passengers.” I rounded on him: “Aren’t you being racist?” I noted that a Qantas or British Airways plane piloted by whites had crashed in Singapore’s Kallang Basin Airport. We had a very rough exchange. He had his agenda. When I took the job, I had no agenda whatsoever. I just wanted harmony between Malaysia and Singapore.
The Brits were obviously less in awe of Kuok's abilities than many Malaysians are, but regardless of who one wants to believe, the matter of "Kuok's decision, without any consultation, to change MSA's insurance arrangements (which ) proved 'entirely unsuitable' and had to be reversed at a cost of M$500,000 (nearly£68,000)" raises questions about the circumstances surrounding the conviction of Gerald Fernandez. As recounted recently on this blog, Fernandez was jailed for 21 months and fined S$5,000 9in 1971) for corruptly receiving S$5,000 in order to show favour to insurance brokers Edward Lumley in connection with MSA affairs (between 1968 and 1970,when Kuok was chairman).
The tension between the Brits and Kuok, and his interference in operational matters (clearly not the business of the chairman of the board) raises questions about the evidence against Fernandez,and whether he was scapegoated with regards Kuok's MSA insurance arrangements.
END
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