We did not see the Russians coming,and we have been humiliated.
We cannot afford to waste time, pondering skills we do not have.
Therefore, taking up the US offer, as explained in 2012 by Ross Babbage,is increasingly a necessity we cannot afford to ignore:
Option five is to buy or lease Virginia-class submarines from the US. The Virginias are fast and have almost unlimited endurance. They carry sensors with extraordinary performance such that they can routinely see
potential opponents well before they themselves can be detected, often at trans-oceanic distances.
They have also been designed from scratch to be very flexible and perform a broader range of functions that would deliver Australia strong deterrence power even against a major power.
The Virginia class is in series production, hence the project risks are low. The contract for the 14th Virginia has been signed for a price of $1.2bn, but by the time they are fully fitted out, the sail-away price is $2.5bn. These boats are demonstrating exceptional operational performance and high reliability and would provide class-wide training and upgrade programs. Operating RAN and USN Virginias in close partnership would also take the ANZUS alliance to a new level.
The most obvious obstacle to an Australian purchase of Virginias is that these boats are nuclear-powered. However, their propulsion systems have an exemplary track record, their reactors never need to be refuelled and if the boats were leased, say, for 30 years, they could be handed back to the suppliers for disposal.
We'll be sunk if we don't choose the best submarine
- ROSS BABBAGE
- The Australian
- January 17, 2012 12:00AM
THE powerful national security committee of cabinet is scheduled to meet in the next few weeks to select a plan for Australia's largest defence purchase, a new class of submarines.
There is much at stake. Australia is facing a markedly different security outlook than that of 30 years ago, when planning commenced for the Collins-class submarines.
With the rapid growth of Chinese military capabilities specifically designed to kneecap the US and its allies, and more serious challenges emerging in the Persian Gulf, the centres of global power tensions are now right on our doorstep.
If directly threatened, coerced or attacked, this country needs credible means of deterring and countering even a major power.
It needs one or more powerful instruments with a capacity to stop a belligerent country in its tracks. Advanced submarines are one of very few capabilities that can contribute meaningfully to this.
In a crisis, the new boats should not only be able to sink ships and destroy maritime installations but also fire cruise missiles to precisely strike high-value targets well inland. The right submarine force can give Australia this credible deterrence. That is why getting the submarine decision right is vital.To do this, Australia needs more than just small submarines to serve as crocodiles in the ditch of our immediate approaches. We need vessels that can travel rapidly to East Asia and to the distant reaches of the Indian Ocean to manoeuvre there with high security for extended periods.
The government has five primary options for new submarines.
First, it could select one of the small European or Japanese diesel-electric submarines that have recently been in production. In their basic form, these boats could be delivered for about $600 million each.
They are of some use in shallow coastal waters but would be little more than mobile minefields in the approaches to Australia. Fitting modern US-sourced sensor, fire control, weapons and stealth systems would improve their performance but raise their unit costs to about $1.5 billion.
This option would be relatively cheap and carry only moderate risk. It would be attractive to those arguing any submarine will do. However, the reality is that these boats would be outclassed in the 2030-50 timeframe in the Western Pacific. Their diesel-electric propulsion systems, even with air-independent power generators, would render these boats extremely vulnerable.
They would be relatively slow, have modest endurance and their constricted onboard power would limit their sensor fits and weapon loads. The bottom line is that these boats would not provide the credible deterrence and defensive power Australia needs.
The second option is to build a stretched and debugged Collins-class in Australia. This would entail retention of the current hull diameter but building a longer, more modern and more flexible diesel-electric submarine. The unit price might initially be about $1.8bn but eventually would blow out to about $2.5bn.
This son-of-Collins option would entail considerable risk, would deliver another orphan submarine operated only by Australia and, given the likelihood of technical and other difficulties, would almost certainly arrive late and have low operational availability in service. However, this option would give a considerable boost to Australian industry, particularly in South Australia.
While the son-of-Collins option would eventually deliver better boats than option one, they would still suffer from the problems of diesel-electric propulsion and be outclassed towards the middle of this century.
The third option is a variant of the second. It involves taking forward many of the lessons of the Collins with a larger diameter hull and a completely new submarine design. This son-of-Collins II option would probably promise the largest and most capable diesel-electric submarine in the world and it would deliver an even bigger boost to Australian industry.
An initial quote might be $2.1bn a boat, but would probably end up costing more than $3bn.
However, son-of-Collins II would be fraught with very high risk, the program would inevitably run late and system reliability and online availability would be low.
Son-of-Collins II would eventually be able to carry a wider range of sensors and weapons, but their diesel-electric propulsion systems would still render them vulnerable in the 2030-50 timeframe. These boats would offer only limited deterrence.
Option four would essentially outsource the design, development and production of a son-of-Collins II boat to a major European or Japanese manufacturer. Several companies are already working on designs for large diesel-electric submarines, such as the German Type 216 and the Japanese follow-on to the Soryu-class. This option would aim to reduce program risk by having a foreign manufacturer build and test the first one or two boats overseas and then supervise construction of follow-on boats in Australia.
Option four overlooks the fact that all new submarine classes built by every country experience design and performance problems. The resulting boats would probably still be orphans and expensive to buy. Importantly, they would still have the vulnerabilities inherent in diesel-electric propulsion and they would not deliver the type of strong deterrence and defensive power that Australia now needs.
Option five is to buy or lease Virginia-class submarines from the US. The Virginias are fast and have almost unlimited endurance. They carry sensors with extraordinary performance such that they can routinely see potential opponents well before they themselves can be detected, often at trans-oceanic distances. They have also been designed from scratch to be very flexible and perform a broader range of functions that would deliver Australia strong deterrence power even against a major power.
The Virginia class is in series production, hence the project risks are low. The contract for the 14th Virginia has been signed for a price of $1.2bn, but by the time they are fully fitted out, the sail-away price is $2.5bn. These boats are demonstrating exceptional operational performance and high reliability and would provide class-wide training and upgrade programs. Operating RAN and USN Virginias in close partnership would also take the ANZUS alliance to a new level.
The most obvious obstacle to an Australian purchase of Virginias is that these boats are nuclear-powered. However, their propulsion systems have an exemplary track record, their reactors never need to be refuelled and if the boats were leased, say, for 30 years, they could be handed back to the suppliers for disposal.
When President Barack Obama released the results of the US strategic review two weeks ago, he said the Western Pacific theatre posed new, very demanding challenges for the US and its allies. The US is responding by planning a stronger presence in the Western Pacific and it is looking to its allies to also lift their game. The Australian government needs to face up to the new challenges squarely.
This is not a time to choose second- or third-best. We need a new class of submarines with known costs that can be commissioned on time and that will reliably deliver the powerful deterrence this country needs.
Ross Babbage is a former senior Defence official and founder of the Kokoda Foundation
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