Indian Scorpene designs leaked,Australia's Barracuda compromised for good-DCNS has said so

by Ganesh Sahathevan
The Australian has reported this morning that it has sighted highly detailed plans for the DCNS Indian Scorpene submarine. The Australian then speculates what could happen if the DCNS Barracuda designs are also leaked.The Australian assumes that the Barracuda plans are safe and secure,for the time being.
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has also spoken, and has moved to calm concerns,saying the Indian Scorpenes are a different design to that being built for Australia and are outdated.


Obviously, Turnbull has not been paying attention to what DCNS itself has said:
The main area where Barracuda design references were not used was in the area of the electrical system (batteries and voltage), power generation (induction and diesel generators) and propulsion (main electric motor). In these systems the design reference comes from the Scorpene class of diesel electric submarines, or from an existing submarine technology within DCNS. Existing technologies are re-used in all systems in the Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A. System by system, the whole ship performance is validated and the design loop closed.

-Gerard Autret and Sean Costello,The Strategist, 8 Apr 2016

Gerard Autret is the Chief Naval Architect of the Shortfin Barracuda and a DCNS expert in submarine naval architecture. Sean Costello is the CEO of DCNS Australia.




Again, Turnbull makes the mistake of assuming that the majority share his level of intelligence. Most people can understand that if you have the plans for an older model, you can , with the right tools and skills, figure out what the newer designs can accomplish. In the defence area where PhDs in physics and engineering are a dime a dozen,the leaked Indian Scorpene plans would by now have been used as the basis for forecasting what future designs might look like,and what is needed to counter and better them. That AUD 50 billion is already wasted.

END

References

Our French submarine builder in massive leak scandal

The Indian Navy’s first Scorpene submarine in Mumbai last year.

• The Australian
• 9:47AM August 24, 2016
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• CAMERON STEWART

  

  Associate Editor

  Melbourne

  @camstewarttheoz

  

The French company that won the bid to design Australia’s new $50 billion submarine fleet has suffered a massive leak of secret documents, raising fears about the future security of top-secret data on the navy’s future fleet.

The stunning leak, which runs to 22,400 pages and has been seen by The Australian, details the ­entire secret combat capability of the six Scorpene-class submarines that French shipbuilder DCNS has designed for the Indian Navy.

A variant of the same French-designed Scorpene is also used by the navies of Malaysia, Chile and, from 2018, Brazil, so news of the Edward Snowden-sized leak — ­revealed today — will trigger alarm at the highest level in these countries. Marked “Restricted Scorpene India”, the DCNS documents ­detail the most sensitive combat capabilities of India’s new $US3 bn ($3.9bn) submarine fleet and would provide an ­intelligence bonanza if obtained by India’s strategic rivals, such as Pakistan or China.

The leak will spark grave concern in Australia and especially in the US where senior navy officials have privately expressed fears about the security of top-secret data entrusted to France.

In April DCNS, which is two-thirds owned by the French government, won the hotly contested bid over Germany and Japan to design 12 new submarines for Australia. Its proposed submarine for Australia — the yet-to-be-built Shortfin Barracuda — was chosen ahead of its rivals because it was considered to be the quietest in the water, making it perfectly suited to intelligence-gathering operations against China and others in the ­region.

Any stealth advantage for the navy’s new submarines would be gravely compromised if data on its planned combat and performance capabilities was leaked in the same manner as the data from the ­Scorpene. The leaked DCNS data details the secret stealth capabilities of the six new Indian submarines, including what frequencies they gather intelligence at, what levels of noise they make at various speeds and their diving depths, range and endurance — all sensitive information that is highly classified. The data tells the submarine crew where on the boat they can speak safely to avoid ­detection by the enemy. It also discloses magnetic, electromagnetic and infra-red data as well as the specifications of the submarine’s torpedo launch system and the combat system.

• MORE:Can French keep a secret?

It details the speed and conditions needed for using the periscope, the noise specifications of the propeller and the radiated noise levels that occur when the submarine surfaces.

The data seen by The Australian includes 4457 pages on the submarine’s underwater sensors, 4209 pages on its above-water sensors, 4301 pages on its combat management system, 493 pages on its torpedo launch system and specifications, 6841 pages on the sub’s communications system and 2138 on its navigation systems.

The Australian has chosen to redact sensitive information from the documents.

Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull said it was important to note the submarine DCNS was building for India was a completely different model to the one it will build for Australia and the leaked information was a few years out of date. Nevertheless, any leak of classified information was a concern.

“We have the highest security protections on all of our defence information, whether it is in partnership with other countries or entirely within Australia,” he told the Seven Network today.

“But clearly, it is a reminder that, particularly in this digital world, cyber security is of critical importance.”

Influential senator Nick Xenophon said he would pursue the security breach when parliament returns next week.

Senator Xenophon, who leads a bloc of three senators, said Australia needed serious explanations from DCNS, the federal government and the Defence Department about any implications for Australia.

“This is really quite disastrous to have thousands of pages of your combat system leaked in this way,” the senator told ABC radio.

Sea trials for the first of India’s six Scorpene submarines began in May. The project is running four years behind schedule.

The Indian Navy has boasted that its Scorpene submarines have superior stealth features, which give them a major advantage against other submarines.

The US will be alarmed by the leak of the DCNS data because Australia hopes to install an American combat system — with the latest US stealth technology — in the French Shortfin Barracuda.

If Washington does not feel confident that its “crown jewels’’ of stealth technology can be protected, it may decline to give Australia its state-of-the-art combat system.

DCNS yesterday sought to ­reassure Australians that the leak of the data on the Indian Scorpene submarine would not happen with its proposed submarine for Australia. The company also implied — but did not say directly — that the leak might have occurred at India’s end, rather than from France. “Uncontrolled technical data is not possible in the Australian ­arrangements,” the company said. “Multiple and independent controls exist within DCNS to prevent unauthorised access to data and all data movements are encrypted and recorded. In the case of India, where a DCNS design is built by a local company, DCNS is the provider and not the controller of technical data.

“In the case of Australia, and unlike India, DCNS is both the provider and in-country controller of technical data for the full chain of transmission and usage over the life of the submarines.”

However, The Australian has been told that the data on the Scorpene was written in France for India in 2011 and is suspected of being removed from France in that same year by a former French Navy officer who was at that time a DCNS subcontractor.

The data is then believed to have been taken to a company in Southeast Asia, possibly to assist in a commercial venture for a ­regional navy.

It was subsequently passed by a third party to a second company in the region before being sent on a data disk by regular mail to a company in Australia. It is unclear how widely the data has been shared in Asia or whether it has been obtained by foreign ­intelligence agencies.

The data seen by The Australian also includes separate confidential DCNS files on plans to sell French frigates to Chile and the French sale of the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship carrier to Russia. These DCNS projects have no link to India, which adds weight to the probability that the data files were removed from DCNS in France.

DCNS Australia this month signed a deed of agreement with the Defence Department, ­paving the way for talks over the contract which will guide the design phase of the new ­submarines. The government plans to build 12 submarines in Adelaide to replace the six-boat Collins-class fleet from the early 2030s. The Shortfin Barracuda will be a slightly shorter, conventionally powered version of France’s new fleet of Barracuda-class nuclear submarines.

Defence Industry Minister Christopher Pyne said his officials believed the leak had “no bearing” on the Australia’s submarine program.

“The Future Submarine Program operates under stringent security requirements that govern the manner in which all information and technical data is managed now and into the future,” Mr Pyne’s office said in a statement.

“The same requirements apply to the protection of all sensitive information and technical data for the Collins class submarines, and have operated successfully for decades.”

Restricted data

The secret information the leaked documents reveal:

• The stealth capabilities of the six new Indian Scorpene submarines

• The frequencies at which the subs gather intelligence

• The levels of noise the subs make at various speeds

• Diving depths, range and endurance

• Magnetic, electromagnetic and infra-red data

• Specifications of the submarine’s torpedo launch system and the combat system

• Speed and conditions needed for using the periscope

• Propeller’s noise specifications

• Radiated noise levels when the submarine surfaces

View the leaked documents below. If you are using a mobile device, you can view the extracts on the desktop version of theaustralian.com.au

Secret submarine document one

Secret submarine document two

Secret submarine document three

Additional reporting: Jared Owens, AAP

Designing the Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A

8 Apr 2016|Gerard Autret and Sean Costello

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Editor’s note: The Strategist has invited all three SEA 1000 contenders to explain their approach to meeting Australia’s future submarine requirement.

A common misunderstanding about the conventionally powered Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A is that is somehow “converted” from the nuclear powered French Barracuda. This characterisation is inaccurate. In fact the conventional ship uses the nuclear ship as its design reference.

As a new design for Australia’s specific requirement, the first design activity DCNS conducted was to size the ship. Based on what Australia needs the submarine to do, a calculation is performed to determine the necessary volume and weight required – how much submarine do we need? The answer to this question is found using specific programs within DCNS, and displacement is determined.

From this volume the naval architect then asks the next question – does an existing design approach the estimated displacement? If the answer is ‘yes’, this existing design becomes the reference for the new ship. If the answer is ‘no’, then a completely new design is required. In this situation one design loop will be insufficient and the design agency faces many years of risk reduction activity.

This threshold question is very important to understand and it is possible for different design agencies to answer this question differently, depending on the magnitude of the design loop in question. Design agencies will call on all their background tools, technologies, experience and know-how before answering one way or another. However, in the case of DCNS a clear and positive decision was made that the French Navy’s Barracuda would provide a very suitable design reference for the Shortfin Barracuda.

The data that enabled the selection of the Barracuda as the Australian design reference included such things hull diameter, length and steel, existing hydrodynamic studies of manoeuvrability, drag  and acoustic performances and the suitability of main systems including, ship control, electrical, hydraulic, sonar, sensors, habitability, weapons storage, cooling, and ancillary platform systems. In each of these major systems the existing system design of the French Barracuda is used for the Shortfin Barracuda and from these known references an interpolation is performed for the new system design.

DCNS has high confidence in the performance of the design as the Shortfin Barracuda is within the envelope of the nuclear design. Where the nuclear design’s systems are not transferable the next most applicable systems are chosen. The main area where Barracuda design references were not used was in the area of the electrical system (batteries and voltage), power generation (induction and diesel generators) and propulsion (main electric motor). In these systems the design reference comes from the Scorpene class of diesel electric submarines, or from an existing submarine technology within DCNS. Existing technologies are re-used in all systems in the Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A. System by system, the whole ship performance is validated and the design loop closed.

The selection of the nuclear Barracuda as the design reference for the Shortfin also enabled DCNS to meet requirements in addition to range and endurance. The Australian requirements for warm water operations and very low acoustic signatures are good examples. As the nuclear Barracuda is designed to operate globally, shares the same hull form as the Shortfin Barracuda and is also compliant with nuclear safety standards, it is very suitable for the Australian requirement. This avoids many years of design studies for validation of equipment such as pumps and hoses, and allows the designer to take margins for higher performances elsewhere in the ship.

Acoustic performance is driven by three related factors of onboard equipment: silencing, reduction in the noise of the propeller and the overall hydrodynamic performance of the hull while manoeuvring. For the Australian requirement the nuclear Barracuda is again the closest design reference and all the relevant ship systems are reused. The challenge for any attack submarine is to maintain a nearly silent acoustic signature at a speed necessary to manoeuvre within weapons range of the target. The nuclear Barracuda is designed to reduce radiated noise when operating at a speed sufficient in order to close a threat submarine undetected. Of particular importance is the pump-jet propulsor, which combines a rotor and stator within a duct to significantly reduce the level of radiated noise through the effects of wake harmonisation and avoidance of cavitation.

One other myth worth debunking is that designers of nuclear submarines do not have to manage the power consumption of on board equipment as electricity from the reactor is “unlimited”. In large attack submarines, such as the French and proposed Australian Barracuda, the power consumption of the hotel load (the electricity needed to power the combat system and maintain the life support of the crew) is more than that of the propulsion system at the most frequently used speeds. In the case of nuclear submarines, the very high cost and significant weight of the reactor, as well as the safety requirement to operate on batteries without the reactor online, drives the architect to minimise the consumption of the hotel load to the lowest realisable level. In the case of a conventional submarine the preservation of energy in the main storage battery drives the same system design.

In summary, the description of the design process and choices made in the development of the Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A show that one submarine is not converted to another. Rather, a design reference is selected and an iteration of a new design is developed to meet the requirement with interpolation of known data and the re-use of proven technologies.

AUTHOR

Gerard Autret is the Chief Naval Architect of the Shortfin Barracuda and a DCNS expert in submarine naval architecture. Sean Costello is the CEO of DCNS Australia.

Manila’s Bungle in The South China Sea-Barry Wain's FEER story from 2008 shows frightening similarities between the Filipino bungle and Najib's China deals

Far Eastern Economic Review January/February 2008 Manila’s Bungle in The South China Sea by Barry Wain When Vietnamese students gathered outside the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi last December to protest against China’s perceived bullying over disputed territory in the South China Sea, it signaled Hanoi’s intention to turn up the heat a bit. And Beijing reacted in kind; instead of downplaying the incident, a foreign ministry spokesman complained, “China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands.” The bluster on both sides, while just a blip in this long-running feud, is a timely reminder that the South China Sea remains one of the region’s flashpoints. What most observers don’t realize is that in the last few years, regional cooperative efforts to coax Beijing into a more measured stance have been set back by one of the rival claimants to the islands. Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s hurried trip to China in late 2004 produced a major surprise. Among the raft of agreements ceremoniously signed by the two countries was one providing for their national oil companies to conduct a joint seismic study in the contentious South China Sea, a prospect that caused consternation in parts of Southeast Asia. Within six months, however, Vietnam, the harshest critic, dropped its objections and joined the venture, which went ahead on a tripartite basis and shrouded in secrecy. In the absence of any progress towards solving complex territorial and jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea, the concept of joint development is resonating stronger than ever. The idea is fairly simple: Shelve sovereignty claims temporarily and establish joint development zones to share the ocean’s fish, hydrocarbon and other resources. The agreement between China, the Philippines and Vietnam, three of the six governments that have conflicting claims, is seen as a step in the right direction and a possible model for the future. But as details of the undertaking emerge, it is beginning to look like anything but the way to go. For a start, the Philippine government has broken ranks with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which was dealing with China as a bloc on the South China Sea issue. The Philippines also has made breathtaking concessions in agreeing to the area for study, including parts of its own continental shelf not even claimed by China and Vietnam. Through its actions, Manila has given a certain legitimacy to China’s legally spurious “historic claim” to most of the South China Sea. Although the South China Sea has been relatively peaceful for the past decade, it remains one of East Asia’s potential flashpoints. The Paracel Islands in the northwest are claimed by China and Vietnam, while the Spratly Islands in the south are claimed in part or entirety by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. All but Brunei, whose claim is limited to an exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf that overlap those of its neighbors, man military garrisons in the scattered islets, cays and rocks of the Spratlys. After extensive Chinese structures were discovered in 1995 on Mischief Reef, on the Philippine continental shelf and well within the Philippine 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, Asean persuaded Beijing to drop its resistance to the “internationalization” of the South China Sea issue. Instead of insisting on only bilateral discussions with claimant states, China agreed to deal with Asean as a group on the matter. Rodolfo Severino, a former secretary-general of Asean, has lauded “Asean solidarity and cooperation in a matter of vital security concern.” Asean and China, however, failed in their attempt to negotiate a code of conduct. In the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” signed in 2002, they pledged to settle territorial disagreements peacefully and to exercise restraint in activities that could spark conflict. But the declaration is far from watertight. A political statement, not a legally binding treaty, it doesn’t specify the geographical scope and is, at best, an interim step. Since the issuance of the declaration, a tenuous stability has descended on the South China Sea. With Asean countries benefiting from China’s booming economy, boosted by a free-trade agreement, Southeast Asian political leaders are happy to forget about this particular set of problems that once bedeviled their relations with Beijing. Yet none of the multifaceted disputes has been resolved, and no mechanism exists to prevent or manage conflicts. With no plans to discuss even the sovereignty of contested islands, claimants now accept that it will be decades, perhaps generations, before the tangled claims are reconciled. Recent incidents and skirmishes are a sharp reminder of how dangerous the situation remains. In the middle of last year, Chinese naval vessels fired on Vietnamese fishing boats near the Paracels, killing one fisherman and wounding six others, while British giant BP halted work associated with a gas pipeline off the Vietnamese coast after a warning by the Chinese Foreign Ministry. In the past few months, Beijing and Hanoi have traded denunciations as the Chinese, in particular, maneuver to reinforce territorial claims. Vietnam protested when China conducted a large naval exercise around the Paracels in November. China’s decision in December to create an administrative center on Hainan to manage the Paracels, Spratlys and another archipelago, though symbolic, was regarded as particularly provocative by Hanoi. The Vietnamese authorities facilitated demonstrations outside the Chinese diplomatic missions in both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City to make known their displeasure. Friction can be expected to increase as the demand for energy by China and dynamic Southeast Asian economies rises and they intensify the search for oil and gas. While hydrocarbon reserves in the South China Sea are unproven, the belief that huge deposits exist keeps interest intense. As world oil prices hit record levels, the discovery of commercially viable reserves would raise tensions and “transform security circumstances” in the Spratlys, according to Ralf Emmers, an associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. President Arroyo’s agreement with China for a joint seismic study was controversial in several respects. By not consulting other Asean membersbeforehand, the Philippines abandoned the collective stance that was key to the group’s success with China over the South China Sea. Ironically, it was Manila that first sought a united front and rallied Asean to confront China over its intrusion into Mischief Reef a decade earlier. Sold the idea by politicians with business links who have other deals going with the Chinese, Ms. Arroyo did not seek the views of her foreign ministry, Philippines officials say. By the time the foreign ministry heard about it and objected, it was too late, the officials say. Philippine diplomats might have been able to warn her that while joint development has been successfully implemented elsewhere, Beijing’s understanding of the concept is peculiarly Chinese. The only location that China is known to have nominated for joint development is a patch off the southern coast of Vietnam called Vanguard Bank, which is in Vietnamese waters where China has “no possibly valid claim,” as a study by a U.S. law firm put it. Beijing’s suggestion in the 1990s that it and Hanoi jointly develop Vanguard Bank was considered doubly outrageous because China insisted that it alone must retain sovereignty of the area. Also of no small consideration was the fact that such a bilateral deal would split Southeast Asia. The hollowness of China’s policy of joint development, loudly proclaimed for nearly 20 years, was confirmed long ago by Hasjim Djalal, Indonesia’s foremost authority on maritime affairs, when he headed a series of workshops on the South China Sea. Mr. Hasjim set out to test the concept of joint development, taking several years to identify an area in which each country would both relinquish and gain something in terms of its claims. In 1996, he designated an area of some thousands of square kilometers, amounting to a small opening in the middle of the South China Sea, which cut across the Spratlys and went beyond them. Joint development, unspecified, was to take place in the “hole,” with no participant having to formally abandon its claims. Beijing alone refused to further explore the doughnut proposal, as it was dubbed, complaining that the intended zone was in the area China claimed. Of course it was, that being the essence of the plan, without which it was difficult to imagine having joint development. China’s bottom line on joint development at that time: What is mine is mine and what is yours is ours. Beijing and Manila did not make public the text of their “Agreement for Seismic Undertaking for Certain Areas in the South China Sea By and Between China National Offshore Oil Corporation and Philippine National Oil Company.” After the agreement was signed on Sept. 1, 2004, the Philippine government said the joint seismic study, lasting three years, would “gather and process data on stratigraphy, tectonics and structural fabric of the subsurface of the area.” Although the government said the undertaking “has no reference to petroleum exploration and production,” it was obvious that the survey was intended precisely to gauge prospects for oil and gas exploration and production. Nobody could think of an alternative explanation for seismic work, especially in the wake of year-earlier press reports that CNOOC and PNOC had signed a letter of intent to begin the search for oil and gas. Vietnam immediately voiced concern, declaring that the agreement, concluded without consultation, was not in keeping with the spirit of the 2002 Asean-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties. Hanoi “requested” Beijing and Manila disclose what they had agreed and called on other Asean members to join Vietnam in “strictly implementing” the declaration. After what Hanoi National University law lecturer Nguyen Hong Thao calls “six months of Vietnamese active struggle, supported by other countries,” state-owned PetroVietnam joined the China-Philippine pact. Vietnam’s inclusion in the modified and renamed “Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea,” signed on March 14, 2005, was scarcely a victory for consensus-building and voluntary restraint. The Philippines, militarily weak and lagging economically, had opted for Chinese favors at the expense of Asean political solidarity. In danger of being cut out, the Vietnamese joined, “seeking to make the best out of an unsatisfactory situation,” as Mr. Severino puts it. The transparency that Hanoi had demanded was still missing, with even the site of the proposed seismic study concealed. Now that the location is known, the details having leaked into research circles, the reasons for wanting to keep it under wraps are apparent: “Some would say it was a sell-out on the part of the Philippines,” says Mark Valencia, an independent expert on the South China Sea. The designated zone, a vast swathe of ocean off Palawan in the southern Philippines, thrusts into the Spratlys and abuts Malampaya, a Philippine producing gas field. About one-sixth of the entire area, closest to the Philippine coastline, is outside the claims by China and Vietnam. Says Mr. Valencia: “Presumably for higher political purposes, the Philippines agreed to these joint surveys that include parts of its legal continental shelf that China and Vietnam don’t even claim.” Worse, by agreeing to joint surveying, Manila implicitly considers the Chinese and Vietnamese claims to have a legitimate basis, he says. In the case of Beijing, this has serious implications, since the broken, U-shaped line on Chinese maps, claiming almost the entire South China Sea on “historic” grounds, is nonsensical in international law. (Theoretically, Beijing might stake an alternative claim based on an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf from nearby islets that it claims, but they would be restricted by similar claims by rivals.) Manila’s support for the Chinese “historic claim,” however indirect, weakens the positions of fellow Asean members Malaysia and Brunei, whose claimed areas are partly within the Chinese U-shaped line. It is a stunning about-face by Manila, which kicked up an international fuss in 1995 when the Chinese moved onto the submerged Mischief Reef on the same underlying “historic claim” to the area. Some commentators have hailed the tripartite seismic survey as a landmark event, echoing the upbeat interpretation put on it by the Philippines and China. The parties insist it is a strictly commercial venture by their national oil companies that does not change the sovereignty claims of the three countries involved. Ms. Arroyo calls it an “historic diplomatic breakthrough for peace and security in the region.” But that assessment is, at the very least, premature. Not only do the details of the three-way agreement remain unknown, but almost nothing has been disclosed about progress on the seismic study, which should be completed in the next few months. Much will depend on the results and what the parties do next. Already, according to regional officials, China has approached Malaysia and Brunei separately, suggesting similar joint ventures. If it is confirmed that China has split Asean and the Southeast Asian claimants and won the right to jointly develop areas of the South China Sea it covets only by virtue of its “historic claim,” Beijing will have scored a significant victory. Mr. Wain, writer-in-residence at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, is a former editor of The Wall Street Journal Asia.

Katyusha (Катюшa) sounds good in both Russian and Mandarin-Another way of explaining how Russian equipped Chinese subs can own the South China Sea

by Ganesh Sahathevan


Oftentimes , a song and dance explains complex matters best, especially when dealing with polticians blinded by votes, or  "intelligence" organisations which are anything but, and the otherwise ignorant.

As this writer has said before:  
one ought to be able to estimate Chinese submarine technology using Russian technology as a proxy.

And also:
Australia's Department of Defence has also indicated that the highly stealthy Collins class submarines and P3-Orions (these days kept at home in Darwin) will be used in the exercise.This sounds more like an act of desperation by a department trying to show that it is doing something.


If all that is still too complicated , see 

Beautiful Chinese Military Women (Katyusha) HD

Najib's Luconia Shoals surrender puts Ananda and Pexco's Sarawak concessions in the middle of the proverbial......

by Ganesh Sahathevan

Malaysia's virtual surrender of Luconia Shoals will have implications for oil concessions in the surrounding area, now only nominally granted by Petronas. The largest of these (their words, not mine) is the acerage granted Ananda Krishnan's Pexco. At least one of Pexco's concessions, labelled Block 3 in a Marine Sarawak document, lies just 68.25 nautical miles south west of the North Shoals.

China may or may not be within its rights to declare anything, including the Pexco concessions,within its Luconina Shoals EEZ, but that is not the point when considering the actions of a country that has shown it is happy to ignore international laws, norms and customs.

Poor Ananda, all this even after contributing RM 2 billion to the 1 MDB resuce..........

END 

Reference 

Pedra Branca/Batu Puteh decision suggests Malaysia has surrendered right to Luconia-removing own flag from Luconia Shoals in stark contrast with past practise

by Ganesh Sahathevan

These submissions by the  Government Of Singapore to the International Court Of Justice in the Pedra Branca/Batu Puteh matter were part of Singapore's ultimately successful defence against Malaysia's claim:

6.53 It should be noted that Malaysia has demonstrated her awareness of the significance of flying national emblems over territory for purposes of evidencing sovereignty. Malaysia demanded (and obtained) the lowering of the Singapore Ensign flown until 3 September 1968 over another lighthouse facility maintained by Singapore at Pulau Pisang, a territory over which Singapore does not exercise or claim sovereignty.

7.11 In the present case, neither Johor nor Malaysia ever protested against the regular flying of the British and Singapore emblems over Pedra Branca, even though this was done as a clear display of State authority and without seeking consent from Malaysia or Johor, and Malaysian officials were fully aware of this. 

7.12 Moreover, Malaysia’s long silence regarding this clear and public manifestation of Singapore’s sovereignty over Pedra Branca since 1847 is in sharp contrast to Malaysia’s response to the flying of the Singapore marine ensign on the lighthouse administered by Singapore at Pulau Pisang, an island which belongs to Malaysia. In 1968, Malaysia objected to the flying of the Singapore flag over Pulau Pisang Lighthouse320. Following Malaysia’s objection, Singapore ceased flying her flag on the Lighthouse. In contrast, at no time had Malaysia ever protested against Singapore’s flying of her flag over Pedra Branca. 7.13 If Malaysia had any belief that she had a claim to sovereignty over Pedra Branca, one would have expected Malaysia to have exercised or attempted to exercise her sovereign authority over the island in the same way that she had done with respect to Pulau Pisang, if only to put on record that, notwithstanding Singapore’s presence on Pedra Branca, Malaysia had sovereign authority over the island. This omission on Malaysia’s part is especially significant as it occurred shortly after Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia in August 1965, when the governments of both countries treated each other with the utmost caution on bilateral issues. 

7.14 Singapore contends that, given these facts, Malaysia had consciously (and correctly) decided that, in contrast with Pulau Pisang, any protest was not appropriate with respect to the flying of the Singapore flag on Pedra Branca. 

Given that these arguments led to the decision against Malaysia, one would expect that the Government Of Malaysia would exercise and strenuously defend its right to fly the flag on all its possessions, but this was obviously not the case with Luconia Shoals.  It is hard to see that by removing its own flag, Malaysia has not surrendered its right to the Shoals.

In fact, it does seem as if China has already assumed control of the shoals:

(Hans Berekoven, an Australian  marine archaeologist) chose Malaysia's independence day, August 31 last year, to protest against the situation by raising the Malaysian flag on the tiny island.

It is the first time the video of the incident has been released.

"I took the curator of the museum that we're working with, and a couple of other Malaysian friends, and a journalist from the Borneo Post," he said.

They mounted a stainless steel flagpole into a cement footing and raised the Malaysian flag, as the China Coast Guard vessel watched from about 500m offshore.

"They must have got on the blower to Beijing and Beijing must have got on the blower to Kuala Lumpur, because suddenly there was a big kerfuffle in KL," Mr Berekoven said.

The next morning, a Malaysian aircraft flew low over Mr Berekoven's boat and the island.

"A Malaysian coast guard vessel was despatched. Went out there and unbolted the flag," he said.

"It's absolutely absurd. It's 88 miles, well within the 200 mile economic exclusion zone, and they've forced the Malaysians to take the flag down — their flag, asserting their authority, their sovereignty."

END 

Reference

ABC Australia reports that Malaysia surrendered special rights to Luconia Shoals to China : Rights to adjoining EEZ may be lost

Pedra Branca/Batu Puteh decision suggests Malaysia has surrendered right to Luconia-removing own flag from Luconia Shoals in stark contrast with past practise

by Ganesh Sahathevan

These submissions by the  Government Of Singapore to the International Court Of Justice in the Pedra Branca/Batu Puteh matter were part of Singapore's ultimately successful defence against Malaysia's claim:

6.53 It should be noted that Malaysia has demonstrated her awareness of the significance of flying national emblems over territory for purposes of evidencing sovereignty. Malaysia demanded (and obtained) the lowering of the Singapore Ensign flown until 3 September 1968 over another lighthouse facility maintained by Singapore at Pulau Pisang, a territory over which Singapore does not exercise or claim sovereignty.

7.11 In the present case, neither Johor nor Malaysia ever protested against the regular flying of the British and Singapore emblems over Pedra Branca, even though this was done as a clear display of State authority and without seeking consent from Malaysia or Johor, and Malaysian officials were fully aware of this. 

7.12 Moreover, Malaysia’s long silence regarding this clear and public manifestation of Singapore’s sovereignty over Pedra Branca since 1847 is in sharp contrast to Malaysia’s response to the flying of the Singapore marine ensign on the lighthouse administered by Singapore at Pulau Pisang, an island which belongs to Malaysia. In 1968, Malaysia objected to the flying of the Singapore flag over Pulau Pisang Lighthouse320. Following Malaysia’s objection, Singapore ceased flying her flag on the Lighthouse. In contrast, at no time had Malaysia ever protested against Singapore’s flying of her flag over Pedra Branca. 7.13 If Malaysia had any belief that she had a claim to sovereignty over Pedra Branca, one would have expected Malaysia to have exercised or attempted to exercise her sovereign authority over the island in the same way that she had done with respect to Pulau Pisang, if only to put on record that, notwithstanding Singapore’s presence on Pedra Branca, Malaysia had sovereign authority over the island. This omission on Malaysia’s part is especially significant as it occurred shortly after Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia in August 1965, when the governments of both countries treated each other with the utmost caution on bilateral issues. 

7.14 Singapore contends that, given these facts, Malaysia had consciously (and correctly) decided that, in contrast with Pulau Pisang, any protest was not appropriate with respect to the flying of the Singapore flag on Pedra Branca. 

Given that these arguments led to the decision against Malaysia, one would expect that the Government Of Malaysia would exercise and strenuously defend its right to fly the flag on all its possessions, but this was obviously not the case with Luconia Shoals.  It is hard to see that by removing its own flag, Malaysia has not surrendered its right to the Shoals.

In fact, it does seem as if China has already assumed control of the shoals:

(Hans Berekoven, an Australian  marine archaeologist) chose Malaysia's independence day, August 31 last year, to protest against the situation by raising the Malaysian flag on the tiny island.

It is the first time the video of the incident has been released.

"I took the curator of the museum that we're working with, and a couple of other Malaysian friends, and a journalist from the Borneo Post," he said.

They mounted a stainless steel flagpole into a cement footing and raised the Malaysian flag, as the China Coast Guard vessel watched from about 500m offshore.

"They must have got on the blower to Beijing and Beijing must have got on the blower to Kuala Lumpur, because suddenly there was a big kerfuffle in KL," Mr Berekoven said.

The next morning, a Malaysian aircraft flew low over Mr Berekoven's boat and the island.

"A Malaysian coast guard vessel was despatched. Went out there and unbolted the flag," he said.

"It's absolutely absurd. It's 88 miles, well within the 200 mile economic exclusion zone, and they've forced the Malaysians to take the flag down — their flag, asserting their authority, their sovereignty."

END 

Reference

ABC Australia reports that Malaysia surrendered special rights to Luconia Shoals to China : Rights to adjoining EEZ may be lost