As ASEAN has just discovered, China can use OBOR to force its own position.China's investment in Malaysia pursuant to OBOR (and brought on by the 1 MDB scandal) was obviously a lever that was used to disrupt the joint communique ASEAN had intended on the matter of China's intrusion into the South China Sea.
Dr Liu Jian Xing
Director
-International Cooperation Center, National Development & Reform Commission
Dr. Shuaihua Wallace
Managing Director
-International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development China
Paul Cooper
Chairman -Normal Disney and Young
Chairman -Gane Energy & Resources Pty Ltd (GEAR) and Gane Energy & Resources (China) Limited
Former Non-Executive Director -AXA Asia Pacific Holdings Ltd (AXA APH)
Prof. Wei An Li
President & Chancellor
-Tianjin University of Finance & Economics.
The US Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton expressed her support for Clark-Bosmal plan for construction of Corridor 5C Highway across BiH, during her meeting with Edin Šabanović, executive director of "Bosmal" d.o.o. in New York. Hillary Clinton, wife of former US President Bill Clinton is the only First Lady elected to the Senate as representative of the State of New York. During his visit to the US, Senator Clinton invited Edin Šabanović to a private dinner, together with small group of New York businessmen. During conversation, Senator Clinton commented on the beginning of construction of Corridor 5C Highway across BiH: "I was personally present at the meeting in which General Wesley K Clark decided to take part in this project, with desire to assist in revitalization of BiH economy. I fully support his plan to go into realization of this project together with "Bosmal", as the project is vital for BiH", said Senator Clinton
.
At the dinner, Senator Clinton also evoked many memories that she and her husband, former US President Bill Clinton, have of Bosnia and Herzegovina. General Clark, former supreme commander of NATO and one of key architects of peace in BiH, is interested to, in partnership with "Bosmal" lead the consortium of private investors who would finance the project for construction of highway along Corridor 5C.
The www.bosmal.comwebsite was at least up until 2008, registered in the name of one Mevludin Sinanagic, who is, according to an Internet registery's document, owner of the website, and from the company Bosmal D.O.O.
The same person appears to be the person in charge or at least the contact person for the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) , in Visoko, Bosnia Herzegovina.(www.bbs.bund.de/visoko/kontaktadressen.htm)
….…… The story of the Third World Relief Agency, reconstructed from documents and interviews with police, banking officials and intelligence sources, makes clear how much the Bosnian government depended on outside aid to obtain and pay for desperately needed weapons. It also shows how the embargo drove the Muslim government into alliances with some of the world's most radical states, as well as terrorist movements ……..militants in the terrorist underworld are also believed to have used the relief agency to get money to the Bosnian government, including the wealthy Saudi Arabian emigre Osama Binladen, a suspected sponsor of militant Islamic groups around the Middle East….. Investigators say the agency also had ties to Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, a radical Egyptian cleric who was convicted of planning several terrorist bombings in New York and is linked to the group that carried out the World Trade Center bombing in February 1993. …….. A senior Western diplomat in the region said the Clinton administration knew about the Third World Relief Agency and its activities beginning in 1993. Still, the United States took no action to stop its fund-raising or arms purchases, in large part because of the administration's sympathy for the Muslim government and ambivalence about maintaining the arms embargo.
Hillary Clinton's BOSMAL appearance took place just 5 years after 9-11.It is hard to believe that she was not aware of BOSMAL's antecedents.
It has been previously reported on this blog that the Government Of Singapore's agreements with Malaysia for the supply of water will need revision regardless of the current relationship the country and its leaders have with Malaysia's Najib Razak.It has been previously reported that concerns for the water agreements may be affecting Singapore's desire to fully prosecute the 1 MDB matter.
The data illustrated in the map below was obtained from NASA's GRACE satellite
The Malay Peninsula has clearly suffered a significant loss of groundwater over the period, among the worse in the world. An enlarged version of the map can be sighted at this link.
This depletion would explain in part why catchment levels have been falling, much to the concern of the Singaporeans even as they continue to do what they can to keep the agreements in place, without any change. The data suggests that the catchments are severely stressed, and that lower levels of water can be expected regardless of weather patters.
by Ganesh Sahathevan
Anne Aly is Labor candidate for the WA seat of Cowan.
She is regularly touted as an expert in "counter-terrorism" despite lacking any experience in the area.
Meanwhile, ignored here in Australia is her work for the private contractor Phoenix Group Consulting of Dubai, whose services include covert intelligence training.
Voters are entitled to know what she does, who she reports to, and who she otherwise deals with.
Then, there is the issue of her referring questions from local journalists to person or persons in Malaysia........
END
Dr Anne Aly was born in Egypt and raised in Australia. She is a research fellow at Curtin University with a focus on radicalization, counter terrorism and countering violent extremism. Anne is currently the recipient of an ARC grant to explore how community engagement and uses of terrorist attack sites can function as part of a broader counter terrorism and security approach. She has written over 40 publications on topics ranging from Islamic identity to counter narratives and the policy response to violent extremism. Anne is the author of four books including Terrorism and Global Security: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan). She was appointed to the board of the Council for Australian Arab Relations in 2009 and is currently serving a second term on the board. Also in 2009, she received the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers publications award for her theoretical model of internet radicalization. In 2011, Anne was inducted into the inaugural WA Women’s Hall of Fame for her contributions to national security and counter terrorism. In 2013 she was named one of WA’s 50 most successful women by SCOOP magazine. Anne is also the Founding Chair of People Against Violent Extremism (PAVE) a not for profit organization focused on empowering communities to challenge violent extremism.
The Belt and Road Initiative refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, a significant development strategy launched by the Chinese government with the intention of promoting economic co-operation among countries along the proposed Belt and Road routes. The Initiative has been designed to enhance the orderly free flow of economic factors and the efficient allocation of resources. It is also intended to further market integration and create a regional economic co-operation framework of benefit to all.
The Belt and Road Initiative aims to connect Asia, Europe and Africa along five routes. The Silk Road Economic Belt focusses on: (1) linking China to Europe through Central Asia and Russia; (2) connecting China with the Middle East through Central Asia; and (3) bringing together China and Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, meanwhile, focusses on using Chinese coastal ports to: (4) link China with Europe through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean; and (5) connect China with the South Pacific Ocean through the South China Sea.
Focussing on the above five routes, the Belt and Road will take advantage of international transport routes as well as core cities and key ports to further strengthen collaboration and build six international economic co-operation corridors. These have been identified as the New Eurasia Land Bridge, China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia, China-Indochina Peninsula, China-Pakistan, and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar.
(1) The New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor
The New Eurasia Land Bridge, also known as the Second Eurasia Land Bridge, is an international railway line running from Lianyungang in China’s Jiangsu province through Alashankou in Xinjiang to Rotterdam in Holland. The China section of the line comprises the Lanzhou-Lianyungang Railway and the Lanzhou-Xinjiang Railway and stretches through eastern, central and western China. After exiting Chinese territory, the new land bridge passes through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and Poland, reaching a number of coastal ports in Europe. Capitalising on the New Eurasia Land Bridge, China has opened an international freight rail route linking Chongqing to Duisburg (Germany); a direct freight train running between Wuhan and Mělník and Pardubice (Czech Republic); a freight rail route from Chengdu to Lodz (Poland); and a freight rail route from Zhengzhou to Hamburg (Germany). All these new rail routes offer rail-to-rail freight transport, as well as the convenience of “one declaration, one inspection, one cargo release” for any cargo transported.
(2) The China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor
Linked by land, China, Mongolia and Russia have long established various economic ties and co-operation by way of frontier trade and cross-border co-operation. In September 2014, when the three country’s heads of state met for the first time at the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) Dushanbe Summit, agreement was reached on forging tripartite co-operation on the basis of China-Russia, China-Mongolia and Russia-Mongolia bilateral ties. At the same meeting, the principles, directions and key areas of trilateral co-operation were defined. The three heads of state also agreed to bring together the building of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt, the renovation of Russia’s Eurasia Land Bridge and the proposed development of Mongolia’s Steppe Road. This commitment will strengthen rail and highway connectivity and construction, advance customs clearance and transport facilitation, promote cross-national co-operation in transportation, and help establish the China-Russia-Mongolia Economic Corridor. In July 2015, the three leaders held a second meeting in the Russian city of Ufa. This second summit saw the official adoption of the Mid-term Roadmap for Development of Trilateral Co-operation between China, Russia and Mongolia.
(3) China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor
The China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor runs from Xinjiang in China and exits the country via Alashankou to join the railway networks of Central Asia and West Asia before reaching the Mediterranean coast and the Arabian Peninsula. The corridor mainly covers five countries in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) as well as Iran and Turkey in West Asia.
At the third China-Central Asia Co-operation Forum, held in Shandong in June 2015, a commitment to “jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt” was incorporated into a joint declaration signed by China and the five Central Asian countries. Prior to that, China had signed bilateral agreements on the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt with Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. China had also concluded a co-operation document with Uzbekistan on the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt. This was aimed at further deepening and expanding mutually beneficial co-operation in such areas as trade, investment, finance, transport and communication. The national development strategies of the five Central Asian countries – including Kazakhstan’s “Road to Brightness”, Tajikistan’s “Energy, Transport and Food” (a three-pronged strategy aimed at revitalising the country), and Turkmenistan’s “Strong and Happy Era” – all share common ground with the establishment of the Silk Road Economic Belt.
(4) China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor
During the Fifth Leaders Meeting on Greater Mekong Sub-regional Economic Co-operation, held in Bangkok in December 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang put forward three suggestions with regard to deepening the relations between China and the five countries in the Indochina Peninsula. The suggestions included: (1) jointly planning and building an extensive transportation network, as well as number of industrial co-operation projects; (2) creating a new mode of co-operation for fundraising; and (3) promoting sustainable and co-ordinated socio-economic development. Currently, the countries along the Greater Mekong River are engaged in building nine cross-national highways, connecting east and west and linking north to south. A number of these construction projects have already been completed. Guangxi, for example, has already finished work on an expressway leading to the Friendship Gate and the port of Dongxing at the China-Vietnam border. The province has also opened an international rail line, running from Nanning to Hanoi, as well as introducing air routes to several major Southeast Asian cities.
(5) China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
The concept of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was first raised by Premier Li Keqiang during his visit to Pakistan in May 2013. At the time, the objective was to build an economic corridor running from Kashgar, Xinjiang, in the north, to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port in the south. At present, the two governments have mapped out a provisional long-term plan for building highways, railways, oil and natural gas pipelines and optic fibre networks stretching from Kashgar to Gwadar Port. According to a joint declaration issued by China and Pakistan in Islamabad in April 2015, the two countries will proactively advance key co-operation projects, including phase II of the upgrade and renovation of the Karakoram Highway (the Thakot-Havelian section), an expressway at the east bay of Gwadar Port, a new international airport, an expressway from Karachi to Lahore (the Multan-Sukkur section), the Lahore rail transport orange line, the Haier-Ruba economic zone, and the China-Pakistan cross-national optic fibre network.
In a series of meetings during Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India in May 2013, China and India jointly proposed the building of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor. In December 2013, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor Joint Working Group convened its first meeting in Kunming. Official representatives from the four countries conducted in-depth discussions with regard to the development prospects, priority areas of co-operation and co-operation mechanisms for the economic corridor. They also reached extensive consensus on co-operation in such areas as transportation infrastructure, investment and commercial circulation, and people-to-people connectivity. The four parties signed meeting minutes and agreed the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor joint study programme, establishing a mechanism for promoting co-operation among the four governments.
Key Areas of Co-operation
The five major goals of the Belt and Road Initiative are: policy co-ordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds.
In terms of specifics, policy co-ordination means that countries along the belt and road will, via consultation on an equal footing, jointly formulate development plans and measures for advancing cross-national or regional co-operation; resolve problems arising from co-operation through consultation; and jointly provide policy support to practical co-operation and large-scale project implementation.
Facilities connectivity refers to prioritising areas of construction as part of the Belt and Road strategy. Efforts will be made to give priority to removing barriers in the missing sections and bottleneck areas of core international transportation passages, advancing the construction of port infrastructure facilities, and clearing land-water intermodal transport passages. The connectivity of infrastructure facilities, including railways, highways, air routes, telecommunications, oil and natural gas pipelines and ports, will also be promoted. This will form part of a move to establish an infrastructure network connecting various Asian sub-regions with other parts of Asia, Europe and Africa.
In order to facilitate unimpeded trade, steps will be taken to resolve investment and trade facilitation issues, reduce investment and trade barriers, lower trade and investment costs, as well as to promote regional economic integration. Efforts will also be made to broaden the scope of trade, propel trade development through investment, and strengthen co-operation in the industry chain with all related countries.
With regard to financial integration, action will be taken to enhance co-ordination in monetary policy, expand the scope of local currency settlement and currency exchange in trade and investment between countries along the route, deepen multilateral and bilateral financial co-operation, set up regional development financial institutions, strengthen co-operation in monitoring financial risks, and enhance the ability of managing financial risks through regional arrangements.
In terms of people-to-people bonds, efforts will be made to promote exchanges and dialogues between different cultures, strengthen friendly interactions between the people of various countries, and heighten mutual understanding and traditional friendships. This will all form the basis for the advancement of regional co-operation.
Co-operation Mechanisms
The Belt and Road Initiative upholds the principles of jointly developing the programme through consultation with all interested parties. Existing bilateral and multilateral co-operation mechanisms will be utilised to promote the integration of the development strategies of the countries along the route. Steps will be taken to advance the signing of co-operation memorandums of understanding or co-operation plans for the establishment of a number of bilateral co-operation demonstration projects. Efforts will also be made to set up a sound bilateral joint work mechanism, and to devise an implementation plan and action roadmap for advancing the Belt and Road strategy.
The Silk Road Fund
The US$40 billion Silk Road Fund has been established to finance the Belt and Road Initiative. It will invest mainly in infrastructure and resources, as well as in industrial and financial cooperation. The Fund was set up as a limited liability company in December 2014 with its founding shareholders including China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange, the China Investment Corp, the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank. The Fund will comply with market rules and the international order of finance, and welcome participation from domestic and overseas investors, such as the China-Africa Development Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
The AIIB, a new multilateral development bank (MDB), has been set up with a view to complementing and cooperating with the existing MDBs in order to address infrastructure needs in Asia. AIIB will focus on the development of infrastructure and other productive sectors in Asia, including energy and power, transportation and telecommunications, rural infrastructure and agriculture development, water supply and sanitation, environmental protection, urban development and logistics.
As of December 2015, all of the 57 Prospective Founding Members of AIIB had signed the Articles of Agreement. The initial signatories were Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.
The AIIB Articles of Agreement entered into force on 25 December 2015. On 16 January 2016, the Board of Governors held its inaugural meeting, declaring the Bank open for business and electing Mr. Jin Liqun as President for an initial five-year term.
In Part 3, US Government suspicions about Turnbull given his China connections were published,
And now, from The Australian , 30 April 2016,excerpts which show that Japan ,having just lost the AUD 50 billion submarine contract to France's corruption prone DCNS , is also wondering about the Turnbull's China connections, even if The Australian thinks these were in the past:
“They suspect China has been pulling the strings and Turnbull kowtowed to China. They also suspect Turnbull’s (past) business connections to China served France.
“There is speculation in Japan that this decision was taken by the Turnbull government based on its assessment of Australia’s relations with China. This sends a message that Australia will not be too close to Japan and possibly not even too close to the United States, especially in the South China Sea. If that’s true it also has an impact.”
Yoshiji Nogami, a former vice minister for foreign affairs and now president of the Japan Institute for International Affairs, responded with world weary sarcasm.
“So the submarines in operation lost to the submarines on paper,” he said, in reference to the fact that the French submarine does not yet exist but is merely a design concept.
“It’s just a coincidence but it’s very bad timing. The decision was announced only a couple of weeks after the Prime Minister (Turnbull) visited Beijing and Beijing has been interfering in Australian domestic politics.”
Japan sees Chinese hand in decision to overlook Soryu
Australia’s standing in Japan, our most important geo-strategic partner in Asia, is deeply diminished as a result of the decision to reject its offer to build 12 new submarines for us.
On Monday the Turnbull government notified Tokyo, and on Tuesday it announced the successful bidder was the French firm DCNS.
Japanese opinion of us, elite as well as public opinion, is bruised, tender and bitter as a result.
Many Japanese believe Malcolm Turnbull kowtowed to the Chinese, folding under their unsubtle pressure. The Japanese also believe they were collateral damage in Turnbull’s intense hostility to Japan’s friend, Tony Abbott. These views may be completely unjustified but they are widespread.
Some influential Japanese are even starting to publicly question Australia’s reliability as a strategic partner. There is a sense of Australia not being altogether a serious country.
That important Japanese are saying these things in public ought to give Canberra the most serious pause for reflection.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his government only ever got involved in our submarines because an Australian prime minister, Tony Abbott, asked them to do so.
But then the terms of their engagement kept changing. Australia’s requirements kept changing, as did the identity of our political leadership — the Japanese dealt with three different defence ministers and two different prime ministers over the course of this unhappy saga. Still, all the way along, they were given every reason to think they were still the preferred supplier.
Then their humiliating rejection was leaked in the media before they were told anything about it.
Official Japanese reaction was measured but did not try to conceal Tokyo’s shock and hostility at the outcome.
“The decision was deeply regrettable,” said Japan’s Defence Minister, Gen Nakatani, who demanded a full explanation from Canberra.
On the day of the announcement, I interviewed Seiji Kihara, the State Minister for Foreign Affairs, who confirmed that even at the highest levels Japan had expected, right up until the devastating leak against it, that it would be successful.
Kihara’s comments to me reflect the sober caution of a professional foreign ministry.
“Because the submarine was the symbol of Japan-Australia defence co-operation, and Japan brought both the civilian and government (sectors) together on the project, it is very disappointing that we were not chosen,” he said.
“We accept the decision with humility and sincerity, and quite separately we wish to develop further security co-operation between Japan and Australia.”
You don’t have to travel far beyond the most elevated reaches of official Japanese politeness, however, to get a much starker and more alarming assessment.
Yoichi Funabashi is by a long distance the most influential foreign affairs commentator in modern Japan. Now head of a prestigious think tank, he is a former newspaper editor, a widely read columnist and author of countless internationally acclaimed books on Asian politics, geo-strategic issues, regional co-operation and the US alliance system. He is no hawk, being associated with the centre left of politics, and he knows Australia intimately.
So his words are doubly telling.
“The initial reaction to the deal from the Japanese government and on the part of the defence community has been very much negative,” he says.
“They suspect China has been pulling the strings and Turnbull kowtowed to China. They also suspect Turnbull’s (past) business connections to China served France. All these conspiracy theories are running wild.
“The Abe administration, and the Japanese government generally, were very uncomfortable with the previous Labor government in Canberra. They were very happy to have their soulmate, Tony Abbott, a man they saw as similar to John Howard, replace Labor. Then they were sorry to see Abbott replaced by Turnbull. But they never expected that the higher level promise to Abe from Abbott would be so shabbily trashed.”
Funabashi sees wider strategic implications from the debacle, and they are not good implications for Australia.
“It has been a rude awakening for Abe to see how shallow that US-Japan-Australia facade is — that semi-alliance, just how easily shattered that was.”
Funabashi believes strategic hard heads in Washington will also draw negative lessons about Australia from this episode.
“The US also is naturally very disappointed in this decision,” he says. “They have not hidden their desire to have Australia choose the Soryu (Japanese) submarine. So they too will take a more sober view of trilateral strategic co-operation.”
It is worth pausing here to note Funabashi’s statement of the obvious: that while remaining formally neutral in public, and respecting Australia’s sovereignty, and understanding that ultimately Canberra would choose the best submarine capability available (if one was clearly much better than the others), the Americans nonetheless enthusiastically backed the Japanese and wanted them to win.
Everyone seriously associated with this issue internationally knows this to be the case. That some government officials and one commercial bidder were able to hoodwink several credulous Australian commentators into claiming the Americans were not backing the Japanese is a depressing testament to the shallowness and provincialism of the Australian media and often the strategic debate. Very few commentators have independent foreign sources against whom they can test and verify the stories they are told locally, especially by government. This is a function of Australia’s isolation, and as a result the Australian view of reality in many policy sectors is deeply skewed and inaccurate.
Funabashi also fully acknowledges the weakness of the Japanese bid, its failure to understand how quickly Australian domestic politics was moving or to hire smart local lobbyists early in the process.
Some measure of Funabashi’s analysis is widely shared in Japan and across Asia.
The subs decision was front page news in the Asian editions of The Financial Times andThe Wall Street Journal. The Journal ran an editorial lamenting the opportunity lost for enhanced Australia-Japan strategic co-operation. The editorial’s cross heading was lethal for Australia’s reputation. It said: “Australia rejects a Japanese bid after Chinese pressure.”
The critical reaction is virtually universal among Japanese familiar with international relations.
In Kyoto I meet Hiroshi Nakanishi, an international relations scholar at Kyoto University. He offers the double barrelled Japanese response. The decision won’t destroy Australia-Japan co-operation, he says, but on the other hand: “When it comes to the concrete implementation of co-operation, it might have a long-term impact.”
And he makes this further judgment: “There is speculation in Japan that this decision was taken by the Turnbull government based on its assessment of Australia’s relations with China. This sends a message that Australia will not be too close to Japan and possibly not even too close to the United States, especially in the South China Sea. If that’s true it also has an impact.”
Yoshiji Nogami, a former vice minister for foreign affairs and now president of the Japan Institute for International Affairs, responded with world weary sarcasm.
“So the submarines in operation lost to the submarines on paper,” he said, in reference to the fact that the French submarine does not yet exist but is merely a design concept.
“It’s just a coincidence but it’s very bad timing. The decision was announced only a couple of weeks after the Prime Minister (Turnbull) visited Beijing and Beijing has been interfering in Australian domestic politics.”
Like most people I spoke to in Japan in a week of intensive conversations, Nogami believes, or at least says he believes, that Australia-Japan strategic co-operation will continue to grow because both parties want and need it, though Funabashi cautions there may need to be a cooling-off period.
The sense of disappointment and even betrayal runs across both sides of Japanese politics.
Akihisa Nagashima is a leading politician in the centre left opposition Democratic Party.
He is a former vice minister for defence and national security adviser.
I asked Nagashima if the submarine decision was a setback to vital strategic operation in Asia.
“Yes it is,” he said. “It wouldn’t have been just the submarine itself but all the training and co-operation that goes with it. It’s not just the physical asset; many, many other factors would deepen co-operation.”
However, in a perfectly polite Japanese fashion, Nagashima traces a series of events in Australian politics that affects, damagingly, the way Tokyo looks at Australia now.
“After Australia asked Japan for assistance in this matter, the decision is a result of joint efforts,” he says, “so I don’t want to blame one side.”
And here is the kicker.
“I wonder how the transition in Australian domestic politics affected the submarine deal, from Abbott to Turnbull.
“Recently Turnbull brought a thousand business people to visit Beijing. I just wonder what these actions reveal, and the case of the Chinese so-called private company getting the lease of the Port of Darwin from an Australian government. There was a series of events and the question is how the series of events affected the submarine deal. I don’t know, maybe it was a fair process, I believe.”
Across the board, the Japanese recognise the inadequacies and failings of their own actions. Mitsubishi and Kawasaki were too slow in making a full-blooded commercial commitment to the project. Because they thought they were dealing with a friend and ally, the Japanese weren’t cynical enough in their appreciation of Australian politics.
The Japanese have certainly learnt a lot of lessons from this. One of them, dolefully, may be not to put too much faith and trust in Australia, especially in strategic matters; not to take Australia altogether seriously as a strategic player, even in its own interests.
From Australia’s point of view, this has been one of the worst and most damaging episodes in the postwar relationship with Japan.
This was an episode of vast consequence and epic complexity.
You feel that a lot more information will come out about it in the future.
One story doing the rounds in Japan is that Barack Obama gave Turnbull a pass to choose the French at the very last moment. That would be consistent with the Americans supporting the Japanese all the way through but not going to the wire for them.
And the bigger regional consequences?
Beijing feels delightedly vindicated. It bullied Australia with crude public warnings against choosing the Japanese submarines, and from Beijing’s point of view that bullying worked a treat.
The lessons? Australia can be bullied effectively, and bullying is a good tactic.
Japan feels isolated once more and this isolation reinforces its security anxiety. This anxiety, many analysts believe, in the long run could tempt Japan to look once more at an independent nuclear option. If none of its allies is reliable, it may need to guarantee absolutely its own security, as Donald Trump has suggested.
Asia more widely sees Australia buckling to Chinese pressure. The US is reminded once more of the fickleness of allies.
These perceptions may be unfair but they are widespread.
Finally, if all that our leaders routinely say about the complex security environment we face is true, if their words on the need for us to engage Asia have any meaning, and if all the blather that everyone talks about relative American decline and potential strategic retrenchment in Asia is true, then one thing we need almost more than anything else is a close relationship with Japan.
This whole sorry, messed-up episode has set that back a long, long way. Don’t be fooled for a minute into thinking that doesn’t matter
